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INTRODUCTION 
“In our society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or 
without trial is the carefully limited exception.”1 Writing for the 
Supreme Court majority in the 1987 case United States v. Salerno, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist conjured up this utopia; however, the reality in the 
United States has become quite the opposite. Federal and state jail and 
prison populations have skyrocketed since the 1970s.2 In particular, 
there has been a marked increase in the number of individuals 
imprisoned in jails pretrial and thus before conviction,3 largely through 
 
 1 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 2 According to The Sentencing Project, the United States prison population experienced 
seven hundred percent growth between 1972 and its peak in 2009. NAZGOL GHANDNOOSH, U.S. 
PRISON POPULATION TRENDS: MASSIVE BUILDUP AND MODEST DECLINE 1 (2019), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/u-s-prison-population-trends-massive-
buildup-and-modest-decline [https://perma.cc/U29D-3LX7]. As of March 2020, the Prison 
Policy Initiative reported that “[t]he American criminal justice system holds almost 2.3 million 
people.” WENDY SAWYER & PETER WAGNER, MASS INCARCERATION: THE WHOLE PIE 2020 
(2020), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/pie2020.html [https://perma.cc/7YNR-44HM]. Of 
those 2,300,000 people, state prisons confine approximately 1,300,000 people, state jails confine 
746,000, and federal prisons and jails together confine 226,000. Id. 
 3 As of March 2020, sixty-five percent—470,000 of the 746,000 people held in jails—had not 
yet been convicted of the crime for which state authorities held them. SAWYER & WAGNER, supra 
note 2. The Vera Institute of Justice reached similar conclusions: 
This “pretrial population” has grown significantly over time—increasing 433 percent 
between 1970 and 2015, from 82,922 people to 441,790. People held in pretrial 
detention accounted for an increasing proportion of the total jail population over the 
same time period: 53 percent in 1970 and 64 percent in 2015. This growth is in large 
part due to the increased use of monetary bail. 
LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE DENIED: THE HARMFUL 
AND LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 1 (2019) (footnotes omitted), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WR63-X3VV]. 
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the use of financial conditions of pretrial release like bail.4 In its simplest 
form, bail is an amount of money or property established by a judge at 
arraignment, which a criminal defendant may post to remain out of jail 
during the proceedings leading up to and including trial.5 Judges 
typically fix bail to ensure that the individual appears in court when 
necessary.6 Declining to post bail or, more commonly, lacking the 
financial means to do so, means that the state or federal government 
will incarcerate the individual during the pendency of their trial.7  
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides that “[e]xcessive bail shall not be required,”8 but its text is 
silent on whether there exists an absolute right to the opportunity to 
post bail. After the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act explicitly permitted 
preventive detention,9 the Salerno Court reiterated that the Eighth 
 
 4 “A significant driver of the growing number of people in jail awaiting trial has been a 
paradigm shift toward financial conditions of pretrial release. . . . As a result, members of the 
poorest communities are harmed most profoundly, despite constitutional prohibitions on 
punishing people for their poverty.” DIGARD & SWAVOLA, supra note 3, at 2. 
 5 The State of New York, for example, defines bail as follows: 
A court fixes bail when, having acquired control over the person of a principal, it 
designates a sum of money and stipulates that, if bail in such amount is posted on 
behalf of the principal and approved, it will permit him to be at liberty during the 
pendency of the criminal action or proceeding involved. 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3) (McKinney 2020). 
Black’s Law Dictionary primarily defines “bail” as “[a] security such as cash, a bond, or property; 
esp., security required by a court for the release of a criminal defendant who must appear in court 
at a future time.” Bail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see also Robert Webster Oliver, 
Bail and the Concept of Preventative Detention, 69 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 8, 8 (1997) (“‘Bail’ usually 
means cash money or a bail bond and is an amount fixed by the Court which is posted by, or on 
behalf of, the defendant which will be delivered to the Court and held to assure the defendant’s 
return to Court whenever necessary.” (footnote omitted)). 
 6 The American Bar Association adds that “[b]ail is not a fine. It is not supposed to be used 
as punishment. The purpose of bail is simply to ensure that defendants will appear for trial and 
all pretrial hearings for which they must be present.” How Courts Work, A.B.A. (Sept. 9, 2019), 
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_
network/how_courts_work/bail [https://perma.cc/5THD-CWZZ]. 
 7 See id.; BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE 
POOR 1 (2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf [https://perma.cc/
3X3P-D4TA] (“With money bail, a defendant is required to pay a certain amount of money as a 
pledged guarantee he will attend future court hearings. If he is unable to come up with the money 
either personally or through a commercial bail bondsman, he can be incarcerated from his arrest 
until his case is resolved or dismissed in court.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 9 Preventive detention is the detention of a defendant leading up to trial without affording 
them the opportunity to post bail. Preventive Detention, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019) (“Confinement imposed usu. on a criminal defendant who has threatened to escape, poses 
a risk of harm, or has otherwise violated the law while awaiting trial . . . .”); see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3142(e)(1) (“If . . . the judicial officer finds that no condition or combination of conditions will 
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Amendment’s bail clause does not convey an absolute right to bail.10 In 
upholding the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act as facially valid, the Salerno 
Court held that the reach of the Eighth Amendment’s bail clause goes 
only so far as to prohibit the imposition of bail that is “excessive” given 
the circumstances.11 In short, a criminal defendant does not have an 
absolute right to the opportunity to post bail; it is constitutional for the 
federal government to incarcerate an individual pretrial without giving 
them the chance to meet financial conditions of release.12 The State of 
New York, in its state constitution, adopted language substantively 
identical to that of the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution,13 and the New York Court of Appeals has long confirmed 
the lack of a constitutional right to bail.14  
The State of New York has contributed substantially to nationwide 
pretrial detention populations.15 Throughout 2019, sixty percent of the 
 
reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of any other person 
and the community, such judicial officer shall order the detention of the person before trial.”). 
 10 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987) (“The Eighth Amendment addresses 
pretrial release by providing merely that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’ This Clause, of 
course, says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.”). 
 11 Id. at 754 (“The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause [of the Eighth 
Amendment] is that the Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be 
‘excessive’ in light of the perceived evil.”). 
 12 See id. 
 13 Compare N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted, nor shall witnesses be 
unreasonably detained.”), with U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, 
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). But for the omission 
of a single comma in New York State’s bail clause, New York’s bail clause mirrors the version 
found in the United States Constitution. 
 14 See, e.g., People ex rel. Shapiro v. Keeper of City Prison, 49 N.E.2d 498, 500 (N.Y. 1943) 
(“[B]ut in the States like New York, whose Constitutions follow the Federal model in this respect 
by prohibiting ‘excessive bail,’ such a constitutional declaration as to bail accords no accused any 
right to bail, but serves only to forbid excessiveness.” (citation omitted)); People ex rel. Fraser v. 
Britt, 43 N.E.2d 836 (N.Y. 1942) (affirming lower court’s authority to deny defendant’s 
application for bail); People ex rel. Klein v. Krueger, 255 N.E.2d 552, 554 (N.Y. 1969) (reaffirming 
that “the State constitutional guarantee against excessive bail does not require that bail be given 
as of right in all noncapital cases”); see also People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 71 N.E.2d 423, 
425 (N.Y. 1947) (explaining that bail may not be “excessive” but that “[t]he bailing court has 
a . . . judicial, not a pure or unfettered discretion” in determining whether the amount of bail is 
excessive). 
 15 Then–New York Governor Andrew Cuomo’s 2019 State of the State Book included the 
following information: 
A review of 2018 cases conducted by the Division of Criminal Justice Services showed 
that, in cases where bail is set, people are still in jail five days after bail is set in 66 
percent of New York City cases and 64 percent of cases outside of New York City. This 
means that there are at least 45,500 people in jail annually across the state because they 
can’t pay bail. 
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New York jail population consisted of individuals incarcerated not for 
the conviction of any crime, but instead because they could not make 
bail.16 These numbers become even more staggering when trained on 
New York City in particular, where almost ninety percent of people 
arrested for misdemeanors cannot post bail set at one thousand dollars 
or less.17 As startling as these figures might be, the repercussions of 
imprisonment for failure to post bail extend far beyond one’s actual 
period of imprisonment pending trial. Not only are individuals held on 
bail nine times more likely to plead guilty to a misdemeanor than those 
free pending trial,18 but spending time confined in jails or prisons19—
particularly in pretrial detention—begets lifelong deleterious effects.20  
 
ANDREW M. CUOMO, 2019 JUSTICE AGENDA: THE TIME IS NOW 140 (2019) [hereinafter 2019 
JUSTICE AGENDA], https://www.governor.ny.gov/sites/governor.ny.gov/files/atoms/files/
2019StateoftheStateBook.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9LB-KWS5]. 
 16 “On any given day in early 2019, more than 22,000 New Yorkers were incarcerated in 
a local jail—about 8,000 in New York City and 14,000 in the rest of the state. As is the 
case in local jails across the country, more than six in ten of these individuals were held 
pretrial, prior to a conviction, usually stemming from an inability to afford money 
bail.” 
MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM IN NEW 
YORK: LEGISLATIVE PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEW YORK CITY 1 (2019) [hereinafter 
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK], https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/media/
document/2019/Bail_Reform_NY_full_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/2K2U-6TKR]. 
 17 “In [New York City], nearly 90% of people charged with misdemeanors can’t afford bail of 
$1,000 or less. As a result, on average, they will spend over two weeks in jail at Rikers Island.” 
BROOKLYN CMTY. BAIL FUND, MASS INCARCERATION FACT SHEET 1 (2020) [https://perma.cc/
K3LN-LFWY]. 
 18 Id. Nationwide, a 2018 study by the American Economic Review similarly revealed that 
initial pretrial release decreases the probability of being found guilty by 14.0 percentage 
points, a 24.2 percent change from the mean for detained defendants . . . . The decrease 
in conviction is largely driven by a reduction in the probability of pleading guilty, 
which decreases by 10.8 percentage points, a 24.5 percent change. 
Will Dobbie, Jacob Goldin & Crystal S. Yang, The Effects of Pretrial Detention on Conviction, 
Future Crime, and Employment: Evidence from Randomly Assigned Judges, 108 AM. ECON. REV. 
201, 203 (2018). 
 19 Although the terms “prison” and “jail” are often used interchangeably, each facility serves 
a distinct purpose. Prisons are generally state or federal facilities that hold individuals “in long-
term confinement as punishment for a crime, or in short-term detention while waiting to go to 
court as criminal defendants.” Prison, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Alternatively, 
jails are generally “a local government’s detention center where persons awaiting trial or those 
convicted of misdemeanors are confined.” Jail, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); see 
also What Is the Difference Between Jails and Prisons?, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS. [https://perma.cc/
9ET3-B383]; Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1579 n.76 (2003). 
 20 “Each year in prison takes 2 years off an individual’s life expectancy. With over 2.3 million 
people locked up, mass incarceration has shortened the overall U.S. life expectancy by almost 2 
years.” Emily Widra, Incarceration Shortens Life Expectancy, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Mar. 
2021), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2017/06/26/life_expectancy [https://perma.cc/VZJ7-
FQDQ]. 
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The tragic experience of Kalief Browder captured the conscience 
of New Yorkers and Americans alike,21 as the many broken aspects of 
our criminal justice system, including New York’s pretrial detention 
mechanisms, converged on Mr. Browder to steal his life.22 On May 15, 
2010, an officer arrested Mr. Browder, a sixteen-year-old Black kid from 
The Bronx, after Mr. Browder was accused of stealing a backpack.23 Mr. 
Browder’s bail was set at three thousand dollars, an amount beyond his 
and his family’s financial means.24 As a result, he was confined to Rikers 
Island, a notoriously violent jail complex,25 during the pendency of his 
trial.26 In spite of the Sixth Amendment’s speedy trial guarantee,27 Mr. 
Browder spent over three years on Rikers Island pretrial, about two 
years of which he dwelt in solitary confinement.28 On May 29, 2013, 
after Mr. Browder had already suffered years of mental and physical 
abuse, and after surviving attempts to take his own life, he was released 
from Rikers Island; after over three years, the District Attorney decided 
to drop the case, deeming it too weak to take to trial.29 Although Mr. 
 
 21 See generally Time: The Kalief Browder Story (Spike television broadcast Mar. 1, 2017). 
 22 Much of the tragedy around Mr. Browder’s ordeal lies not in its uniqueness, but rather in 
its representation of innumerable similarly appalling stories. See, e.g., Matt Taibbi, Jailed for Being 
Broke, ROLLING STONE (June 23, 2015, 1:00 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/politics/politics-
news/jailed-for-being-broke-72132 [https://perma.cc/KS2N-SFRV]. 
 23 Like Chief Justice Rehnquist naively viewed pretrial detention as the “carefully limited 
exception,” the arresting officer in Mr. Browder’s case believed the same, misinforming Mr. 
Browder that he was “just going to take [Mr. Browder] to the precinct. Most likely [Mr. Browder] 
can go home.” Mr. Browder would not go home for more than three years. Jennifer Gonnerman, 
Before the Law, NEW YORKER (Sept. 29, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/10/
06/before-the-law [https://perma.cc/BDU9-S748]; see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 
(1987). 
 24 Seventy-four days later, Mr. Browder was indicted on second-degree robbery charges. The 
Department of Probation determined this was a probation violation from an earlier incident, 
leading the judge to remand Mr. Browder without bail. Gonnerman, supra note 23. 
 25 A one-time slaughterhouse for pigs and a one-time landfill, Rikers Island confines 
thousands of individuals and has provided the backdrop for far too many violent, lethal 
encounters to list here; the maelstrom that is Rikers Island warrants a Note unto itself, but for an 
inside look at life on Rikers Island from those confined there and those who work there, see 
Noreen Malone & Raha Naddaf, This Is Rikers: From the People Who Live and Work There, 
MARSHALL PROJECT (June 28, 2015, 9:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/28/
this-is-rikers [https://perma.cc/Y6CT-2FWD]. 
 26 Id. 
 27 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 28 Mr. Browder was frequently placed in solitary confinement after fights with other 
incarcerated people. Gonnerman, supra note 23 (“Not long after arriving on Rikers, Browder 
made his first trip to solitary confinement. It lasted about two weeks, he recalls, and followed a 
scuffle with another inmate.”); Benjamin Weiser, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Brought Changes to 
Rikers. Now It Has Led to a $3 Million Settlement., N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/24/nyregion/kalief-browder-settlement-lawsuit.html 
[https://perma.cc/9S8S-T4LV]. 
 29 Gonnerman, supra note 23. 
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Browder was finally freed from Rikers Island, sans guilty plea or 
conviction,30 his life was irreparably altered.31 On June 6, 2015, Mr. 
Browder took his own life at the age of twenty-two.32 This chilling 
excerpt further illustrates the tragedy:  
“He may have hung himself, but the strings were pulled by the 
system,” Venida [Browder] once said. This is a reality that Kalief 
Browder’s mother lived with every day: that her son didn’t take his 
own life so much as submit to a weight he carried with him out of 
the hole. The imagery sticks: Kalief’s body, the cord around his neck, 
its other end disappearing somewhere in the depths of Rikers Island.33 
Mr. Browder’s death wrought by the icy steel hands of New York’s 
criminal justice system precipitated the State’s newfound effort to 
reform its racially34 and economically discriminatory bail system.35 
In April 2019, New York State enacted sweeping reforms to its 
criminal justice system set to take effect on January 1, 2020.36 Among 
 
 30 Id. 
 31 In Mr. Browder’s own words upon his release, “I’m not all right. I’m messed up.” Alysia 
Santo, No Bail, Less Hope: The Death of Kalief Browder, MARSHALL PROJECT (June 9, 2015, 6:04 
PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/09/no-bail-less-hope-the-death-of-kalief-
browder [https://perma.cc/D8AC-HRS3]. 
 32 Natalie Chang, This Is Solitary, ATLANTIC (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/
sponsored/spike/this-is-solitary/1245 [https://perma.cc/Q7H8-A7HY]; see Jennifer Gonnerman, 
Kalief Browder, 1993–2015, NEW YORKER (June 7, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/
news-desk/kalief-browder-1993-2015 [https://perma.cc/Z4KB-STJF]. 
 33 Chang, supra note 32 (emphasis added). 
 34 See JAEOK KIM, QUINN HOOD & ELLIOT CONNORS, VERA INST. OF JUST., THE IMPACT OF 
NEW YORK BAIL REFORM ON STATEWIDE JAIL POPULATIONS: A FIRST LOOK 16 (2021), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/the-impact-of-new-york-bail-reform-on-
statewide-jail-populations.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ96-WM67] (recounting preexisting racial 
disparities in New York City pretrial admissions and analyzing bail reform’s lack of impact on 
those disparities). 
 35 Mr. Browder’s death brought to the forefront the issue of reforming the State’s system of 
pretrial detention: 
The move to sharply curtail the use of cash bail, in many ways, was the long-awaited 
response to the case of Mr. Browder . . . . For many left-leaning politicians, he is a 
symbol of the problems inherent in the bail system, which they argue discriminates 
against the poor. When Democrats seized control of the state Legislature last fall, the 
party finally appeared poised to stop the use of cash deposits or bonds to ensure people 
return to court. . . . Andrea Stewart-Cousins, a Westchester County Democrat, 
reiterated that she and fellow Democrats in her chamber wanted to “make sure that 
we’re not criminalizing poverty, and that there would never, ever, ever be another 
instance of a Kalief Browder.” 
Jesse McKinley & Ashley Southall, Kalief Browder’s Suicide Inspired a Push to End Cash Bail. Now 
Lawmakers Have a Deal., N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 29, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/29/
nyregion/kalief-browder-cash-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/UFG8-5QKQ]. 
 36 See generally S. 1509, 2019 Leg., 242d Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Barry Kamins, Annual Review of 
New Criminal Justice Legislation, 91 N.Y. ST. BAR J. 24 (2019) (summarizing the reforms). 
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the goals of these reforms, the State intended to diminish economic 
inequality in its bail and pretrial detention systems. Before turning even 
three months old, these reforms reduced the pretrial prison population 
in New York City by forty percent: as of March 5, 2020, about three 
thousand people were in New York City prisons awaiting trial, down 
from nearly five thousand people at the time of the reform’s 
enactment.37 Progress notwithstanding, just months after the new bail 
law had taken effect, the Legislature enacted a series of amendments, 
restoring the bail law somewhat closer to its original state before the 
April 2019 reforms.38  
This Note will analyze how, despite the fact that New York’s bail 
reforms reduced city and state prison populations, the revised bail law 
falls flat in its attempt to resolve the economic inequality in the State’s 
pretrial detention system—an overarching purpose of the reforms.39 
Part I of this Note will chronicle the turbulent recent history of bail 
reform in New York and will describe the key differences between the 
old bail laws, the reformed bail laws, and the amendments to those 
reforms. Part II will analyze how the current state of New York’s pretrial 
detention system does little to address the Legislature’s goals. After 
assessing the shortcomings of the newly minted—and subsequently 
reminted—bail law, Part III of this Note will offer solutions to ensure 
that the bail law achieves its intended purposes. These solutions will 
focus on securing an individual’s return to court and reducing pretrial 
detention, while also ensuring that an individual’s wealth does not 
decide their freedom while they await trial.  
 
 37 MICHAEL REMPEL & KRYSTAL RODRIGUEZ, CTR. FOR CT. INNOVATION, BAIL REFORM 
REVISITED: THE IMPACT OF NEW YORK’S AMENDED BAIL LAW ON PRETRIAL DETENTION 12 
(2020) [hereinafter BAIL REFORM REVISITED], https://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/
files/media/document/2020/bail_reform_revisited_05272020.pdf [https://perma.cc/X2A7-
E2LM]. 
 38 See Jamiles Lartey, New York Rolled Back Bail Reform. What Will the Rest of the Country 
Do?, MARSHALL PROJECT (Apr. 23, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/
04/23/in-new-york-s-bail-reform-backlash-a-cautionary-tale-for-other-states [https://perma.cc/
Y9TB-KBU7]; Beth Fertig, What the New Rollbacks to Bail Reform Mean in New York, 
GOTHAMIST (July 2, 2020, 8:07 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/what-new-rollbacks-bail-
reform-mean-new-york [https://perma.cc/TYK9-3V3G]. 
 39 See S. 1509, 2019 Leg., 242d Sess., Part JJJ (N.Y. 2019). 
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I.     BACKGROUND 
A.     New York’s Bail History, in Brief 
Bail and pretrial detention are far from novel tools of “criminal 
justice”; their usage spans thousands of years.40 In New York, the recent 
bail reform efforts are not the first time New Yorkers have focused their 
radar on this ancient aspect of the criminal justice system.41 Bail reform 
efforts in New York have roots that stretch to the 1960s and beyond.42 
After learning of—and expressing horror at—New York City’s prison 
population in 1960, Louis Schweitzer, a retired chemical engineer and 
businessman,43 teamed up with Herbert Sturz, a magazine editor, to 
found the nonprofit Vera Foundation,44 known today as the Vera 
Institute of Justice.45 The Vera Foundation’s initial iteration had one 
primary mission: to create a bail fund geared toward shrinking New 
York City’s rising pretrial prison population.46 Though this bail fund 
would help some individuals gain a semblance of freedom before trial, 
 
 40 TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M. B. BROOKER, THE HISTORY OF 
BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 1 (2010), https://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/ccjj/Committees/BailSub/
Handouts/HistoryofBail-Pre-TrialRelease-PJI_2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/45YY-GNY4] 
(“While the notion of bail has been traced to ancient Rome, the American understanding of bail 
is derived from 1,000-year-old English roots. . . . ’[B]ail [originally] reflected the judicial officer’s 
prediction of trial outcome.’ In fact, bail bond decisions are all about prediction, albeit today 
about the prediction of a defendant’s probability of making all court appearances . . . .” (second 
alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
 41 See, e.g., Bail Reform, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 1965, at 34. 
 42 See generally CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., N.Y.U., PREVENTIVE DETENTION IN NEW 
YORK: FROM MAINSTREAM TO MARGIN AND BACK (2017), https://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/
default/files/upload_documents/2017-CACL-New-York-State-Bail-Reform-Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8KC7-CM5V]. 
 43 1970s Mr. Schweitzer might have been further horrified if 1990s Mr. Schweitzer told him 
that, before the turn of the millennium, New York City’s pretrial prison population would more 
than double. See Incarceration Trends, VERA INST. OF JUST. [https://perma.cc/8M7R-7UEA] 
(detailing the explosion of New York City’s pretrial prison population from around 6,300 in 1970 
to over 14,500 in 1995); see also Lee S. Friedman, The Evolution of a Bail Reform, 7 POL’Y SCIS. 
281, 285 (1976) (“The germination of what was soon to become the Vera Foundation occurred 
in the Fall of 1960 at a cocktail party, when Louis Schweitzer was asked if he was aware of the 
number of people confined in the New York City jails awaiting trial. Astounded by an answer of 
‘thousands,’ he arranged through Anna Kross, then New York City’s Commissioner of 
Corrections, to tour the facilities.”). 
 44 Friedman, supra note 43, at 285–86. 
 45 Today, Vera’s mission is “[t]o end the overcriminalization and mass incarceration of 
people of color, immigrants, and people experiencing poverty.” It envisions “[s]afe, healthy, 
empowered communities and a fair, accountable justice system.” About Us, VERA INST. OF JUST., 
https://www.vera.org/about [https://perma.cc/P9LW-KHUU]. 
 46 Friedman, supra note 43, at 286. 
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it would never resolve the underlying issues wrought by New York’s 
harsh bail system.47 This realization brought about the Manhattan Bail 
Project. The Project identified indigent defendants who posed little risk 
of flight to avoid prosecution. It then recommended to judges who 
should be granted release through the pendency of their trial.48 This 
study quickly proved a reliable tool—perhaps as reliable as bail itself—
in predicting and ensuring an individual’s return to court.49 A year 
before the Manhattan Bail Project concluded operations, New York 
City institutionalized the Project’s release on recognizance procedures 
in the Office of Probation.50  
In the years following the efforts of the Vera Foundation and the 
Manhattan Bail Project, the issues of bail and, in particular, preventive 
detention remained at the forefront of the conversation around 
criminal justice reform.51 Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, advocates 
split on whether the State should allow judges to impose preventive 
detention because the individual posed a risk to public safety,52 or 
whether the practice should be outlawed.53 Studies have shown that the 
consideration of public safety or “dangerousness” can function as a 
proxy for racism, as judges are more likely to find nonwhite defendants 
 
 47 Id. at 287. 
 48 Id. As the Project grew more successful, it continued to recommend the release of more 
individuals on their own recognizance: 
In its first months the Project recommended only 27 percent of their interviews for 
release. After almost a year of successful operation, with the growing confidence of 
judges, the Project recommended nearly 45 percent of arrestees for release. After three 
years of operation, the percentage grew to 65 percent with the Project reporting that 
less than one percent of releases failed to appear for trial. 
SCHNACKE, JONES & BROOKER, supra note 40, at 10. 
 49 “During the 3 year experiment, 3505 defendants had been granted ROR following 
Vera recommendations. Only 56 parolees, or 1.6% of the total, failed to appear. The 
ROR system, as used in the experiment, seemed at least as reliable as bail (4% fail to 
appear) in ensuring appearance for a large number of defendants.” 
Friedman, supra note 43, at 290–91. 
 50 Id. at 292–93. In 1973, the Pretrial Services Agency (PTSA) was created to take over the 
program and in 1977, “PTSA became independent from Vera and was incorporated as the New 
York City Criminal Justice Agency.” MARY T. PHILLIPS, A DECADE OF BAIL RESEARCH IN NEW 
YORK CITY 2 (2012), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/DecadeBailResearch12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/2X26-996U]. 
 51 See CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 1–3. 
 52 “Proponents of the practice suggested it would improve public safety and [would allow] 
judges to be candid about a factor they already covertly considered.” Id. at 3. 
 53 “Critics countered that judges and lawyers could not accurately predict who would be a 
danger if released. They also believed the practice was antithetical to the notions of due process 
and the Constitution’s prohibitions on excessive bail.” Id. 
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more “dangerous” than white defendants.54 Although New York opted 
not to allow for preventive detention on the basis of public safety, the 
vast majority of jurisdictions nationwide—both federally and at the 
state level—allow preventive detention on this basis.55 Although the 
Supreme Court in 1987 declared preventive detention on the basis of 
risk to public safety constitutional,56 New York remains, to this day, in 
the scant minority of states prohibiting the practice.57 In the years since, 
the question has thus morphed from whether preventive detention is 
constitutional to whether preventive detention is fair and just.  
B.     New York’s 2019 Bail Reforms 
1.     Political Context of the 2019 Reforms 
“Akeem, I want you to know that your brother did not die in 
vain,”58 then–New York Governor Andrew Cuomo vowed to Kalief 
Browder’s brother during his 2018 State of the State address, promising 
to rectify New York’s cruel criminal justice system.59 Among an array 
of criminal justice reforms, Governor Cuomo specifically proposed an 
 
 54 See Roxanna Asgarian, The Controversy Over New York’s Bail Reform Law, Explained, VOX 
(Jan. 17, 2020, 8:30 AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2020/1/17/21068807/new-york-bail-
reform-law-explained [https://perma.cc/QZQ7-9M2A] (“The idea of ‘dangerousness,’ advocates 
stress, is tied into the racial discrepancies of our justice system. Two studies of state court data 
from 75 large jurisdictions in the 1990s found that bail was set at significantly higher rates for 
black and Latinx people.”). Nonwhite defendants are denied bail more often than white 
defendants, and mean bail amounts are higher for nonwhite defendants than for white 
defendants. See generally Traci Schlesinger, Racial and Ethnic Disparity in Pretrial Criminal 
Processing, 22 JUST. Q. 170 (2005); Stephen Demuth, Racial and Ethnic Differences in Pretrial 
Release Decisions and Outcomes: A Comparison of Hispanic, Black, and White Felony Arrestees, 
41 CRIMINOLOGY 873 (2003). 
 55 “New York ultimately decided against allowing preventive detention. This choice was 
praised as a victory for civil liberties. However, in the years that followed, the national tide turned 
firmly in favor of preventive detention.” CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 3. 
 56 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 748 (1987). For a more thorough look into the 
constitutionality of preventive detention, see CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 
6–9. 
 57 CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 1; PHILLIPS, supra note 50, at 25. 
 58 Andrew Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Outlines 2018 Agenda: Realizing the Promise of 
Progressive Government, YOUTUBE, at 46:22–28 (Jan. 3, 2018), https://youtu.be/N4SVFp8EFXw 
[https://perma.cc/23V6-MF3B]. 
 59 Id. at 41:40. For a written transcript of Governor Cuomo’s 2018 State of the State address, 
see Video, Audio & Rush Transcript: Governor Cuomo Outlines 2018 Agenda: Realizing the 
Promise of Progressive Government, N.Y. STATE (Jan. 3, 2018) [https://perma.cc/B67F-9WLY] 
(“Our bail system is biased against the poor . . . . [O]ur jails are filled with people who should not 
be incarcerated. . . . The blunt ugly reality is that too often, if you can make bail you are set free 
and if you are too poor to make bail you are punished.”). 
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overhaul to New York’s bail laws.60 But the time was not politically ripe 
for the passage of such reforms into law: although a Democratic-
majority Assembly was paired with a Democratic governor, a 
Republican-majority Senate forestalled any chance of substantive 
criminal justice reform. Bail reform became a much more plausible 
reality when the New York State Senate gained a Democratic majority 
in the November 2018 elections.61 With the Assembly maintaining a 
Democratic majority62 and Democratic Governor Cuomo winning 
reelection,63 the Democratic Party assembled its first “trifecta”64 since 
2010.65 Finally, New York State seemed poised to make good on the 
Governor’s promise to Akeem Browder: to enact meaningful, 
progressive bail reform.66 For perhaps the first time in decades, the State 
seemed unified in pursuing and achieving this elusive goal.  
 
 60 Governor Cuomo outlined the following priorities of potential reforms: 
We must reform our bail system so a person is only held if a judge finds either a 
significant flight risk or a real threat to public safety. If so, they should be held in 
preventive detention whether they are rich or poor, black or white—but if not, they 
should be released on their own recognizance whether they are rich or poor, black or 
white. That is only fair. Race and wealth should not be factors in our justice system. 
It’s that clear. 
Cuomo, supra note 58, at 43:09–54 (emphasis added). Incorporating public safety into judges’ 
bail decisions would have constituted a major departure from decades and decades of prior New 
York State law. See generally infra Section II.A. 
 61 New York State Senate Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_
State_Senate_elections,_2018 [https://perma.cc/WD22-LHKF] (“Democrats gained control of 
the chamber and expanded their majority in the 2018 elections for the New York State Senate, 
winning 40 seats to Republicans’ 23. All 63 Senate seats were up for election. At the time of the 
election, Democrats held 32 seats to Republicans’ 31. However, Republicans controlled the 
chamber, as one Democratic state senator caucused with the Republican Party.”). 
 62 New York State Assembly Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/New_
York_State_Assembly_elections,_2018 [https://perma.cc/XL38-FX9C] (“Democrats held their 
veto-proof majority in the 2018 elections for New York State Assembly, winning 106 seats to 
Republicans’ 43 and the Independence Party’s one. All 150 assembly seats were up for election in 
2018. At the time of the election, Democrats held a 104–41 majority.”). 
 63 New York Gubernatorial and Lieutenant Gubernatorial Election, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/New_York_gubernatorial_and_lieutenant_gubernatorial_election,_2018 
[https://perma.cc/YZ34-V8TF]. 
 64 Party Control of New York State Government, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Party_
control_of_New_York_state_government [https://perma.cc/DG3Y-4ZEQ] (“Trifectas influence 
how hard a party must work to advance its agenda. When one party controls the three vital 
centers of state political power—the office of the governor, the state House, and the state Senate—
Ballotpedia considers that party to control a ‘trifecta.’ Trifectas make it easier for the dominant 
party to pursue its agenda, and more difficult for opposition parties to challenge it.”). 
 65 Id. (“In New York, Democrats held trifecta control of state government from 2009 to 2010. 
In all other years from 1992 to 2017, control of state government was divided.”). 
 66 Russell Berman, Democrats in New York Are Ready to Deploy Their Newfound Power, 
ATLANTIC (Dec. 22, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/12/democrats-
new-york-cuomo-progressive-agenda/578896 [https://perma.cc/DM9U-Q22B] (“The result [of 
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Emboldened by a more progressive state government and by bail 
reforms in states including California and New Jersey,67 Democratic 
leadership in New York expressed an interest in ending the use of bail 
altogether.68 Although there seemed to be widespread support for this 
position, disagreement on other issues prevented serious movement in 
the effort to eliminate bail. Specifically, unlike federal law,69 New York 
law allowed judges to consider only the likelihood of an individual’s 
return to court when making bail decisions,70 long disallowing judges 
from considering the individual’s “dangerousness” or risk to public 
safety.71 Akin to the travails of decades earlier,72 views on whether public 
safety should be a valid concern of judges in making bail decisions 
 
the 2018 elections] is the most commanding governing majority Democrats have had in New 
York in decades, giving the party a seemingly unfettered opportunity to enact legislation that has 
been bottled up for years and to place the state firmly on the leading edge of progressive policy 
nationwide. In the next several months, Democrats hope to . . . end a cash-bail system blamed 
for enabling mass incarceration. . . . On criminal-justice reform, activists have secured Cuomo’s 
support for making the state the second in the nation, after California, to end cash bail.”). 
 67 For example, Senate Bill 10, eliminating cash bail entirely, had just been signed into law in 
California. However, after a challenge by the bail bond industry, California voters rejected 
Proposition 25 in the 2020 elections, thereby repealing Senate Bill 10 and allowing cash bail in 
California to see another day. The Times Editorial Board, Editorial: The Welcome but Glacial 
Dismantling of California’s Bail System, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 16, 2019, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2019-12-16/eliminate-bail-in-california-justice 
[https://perma.cc/2HZ7-YHAC]; California Proposition 25, Replace Cash Bail with Risk 
Assessments Referendum (2020), BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_
25,_Replace_Cash_Bail_with_Risk_Assessments_Referendum_(2020) [https://perma.cc/
WRD3-2PED]. In 2017, New Jersey eliminated cash bail almost in its entirety. See N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2A:162-15 (West 2017). 
 68 In addition to Governor Cuomo’s initial proposal to end cash bail, Assembly Speaker Carl 
Heastie explained that “[t]he Assembly Majority remains committed to reforming the state’s 
antiquated criminal justice system by . . . ending cash bail.” Press Release, Carl E. Heastie, 
Assemb. Speaker, Assembly 2019-20 Budget Includes Funding to Combat Gang Violence and 
Invests in Programs to Help New Yorkers Navigate the Criminal Justice System (Mar. 13, 2019), 
https://nyassembly.gov/Press/?sec=story&story=85594 [https://perma.cc/76L4-GG2U]. 
 69 See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b)–(c)(1) (allowing judges to consider whether releasing the 
individual “will endanger the safety of any other person or the community” when making bail 
decisions); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747 (1987) (holding constitutional the 1984 
Bail Reform Act’s provision that judges may consider danger to the community when setting 
bail). 
 70 Cf. In re Restaino, 890 N.E.2d 224 (N.Y. 2008) (removing from the bench a judge who 
committed forty-six individuals into custody, revoking their recognizance release and imposing 
bail, after a cell phone went off in the courtroom and none of the individuals claimed ownership 
of the device). 
 71 Cf. Sardino v. State Comm’n on Jud. Conduct, 448 N.E.2d 83, 84 (N.Y. 1983) (removing 
from the bench a judge who “regularly abused his authority with respect to setting bail . . . [by] 
acting punitively with little or no interest in the only matter of legitimate concern, namely, 
whether any bail or the amount fixed was necessary to insure the defendant’s future appearances 
in court” and who “often ordered defendants to be held without bail for no apparent reason”). 
 72 See supra Section I.A. 
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presented a formidable obstacle73: although Senate Majority Leader 
Andrea Stewart-Cousins and Assembly Speaker Carl Heastie agreed 
that “dangerousness” should not be introduced into the equation out of 
fear of its racist outcomes,74 Governor Cuomo had initially proposed to 
do just that.75 The solution was compromise. The 2019 bail reforms that 
Governor Cuomo would eventually sign into law neither entirely 
eliminated bail, nor did they introduce the concept of public safety into 
judges’ bail decisions.76  
Instead, when the lawmakers struck a deal, the reforms explicitly 
introduced a presumption of release, providing a nondiscretionary 
baseline that the court shall release an individual on their own 
recognizance, unless that individual poses a flight risk,77 tilting the scale 
further toward release rather than confinement. When a court 
determined that an individual posed a risk of flight to avoid 
prosecution, it was now required to “select the least restrictive 
alternative and condition or conditions that will reasonably assure the 
principal’s return to court.”78 In the past, setting bail had functioned as 
the default for many offenses, but the reforms made nearly all 
misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies ineligible for bail.79 For some 
qualifying offenses—mainly violent felonies—a judge could still fix bail, 
but only if the judge deemed it the least restrictive method of assuring 
a defendant’s return to court.80  
Beyond these fundamental alterations to New York’s pretrial 
detention system, the initial reforms put into place three other 
 
 73 See infra Section II.A. 
 74 See Dan M. Clark, NY Senate Dems Have Reservations About ‘Dangerousness’ Standard in 
Bail Reform Bill, Leader Says, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 27, 2019, 3:31 PM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/03/27/ny-senate-dems-have-reservations-about-dangerousness-
standard-in-bail-reform-bill-leader-says [https://perma.cc/NM49-GPSH]. 
 75 See id. 
 76 “Bail reform, which was a major sticking point among lawmakers in recent weeks, will 
leave the option of cash bail in place for most violent felony offenses, Class A felonies and a list 
of other charges outlined in the bill.” Dan M. Clark, Cuomo, Lawmakers Announce Deal on State 
Budget, Criminal Justice Reforms, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 1, 2019, 11:15 AM), https://www.law.com/
newyorklawjournal/2019/03/31/cuomo-lawmakers-announce-deal-on-state-budget-criminal-
justice-reforms [https://perma.cc/5WT8-E3LY]. 
 77 “[T]he court shall release the principal pending trial on the principal’s own recognizance, 
unless it is demonstrated and the court makes an individualized determination that the principal 
poses a risk of flight to avoid prosecution.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1) (McKinney 2020) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (emphases added). The statute’s prior language required 
the court to release the principal on their own recognizance, fix bail, or commit the principal to 
the sheriff’s custody, but it did not indicate any presumption. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10 
(McKinney 2019) (effective through Dec. 31, 2019). 
 78 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1) (McKinney 2020) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). 
 79 See id. § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). 
 80 Id. 
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significant changes: (1) requiring judges to offer individuals three forms 
of bail for eligible offenses;81 (2) providing a variety of nonmonetary 
conditions that judges could impose to ensure an individual’s return to 
court;82 and (3) instructing judges to consider an individual’s “activities 
and history” when making decisions about pretrial conditions.83  
2.     Three Forms of Bail 
In those circumstances where the charged offense qualified for bail 
and a court determined that fixing bail was the least restrictive 
condition to ensure the individual’s return to court, the reforms 
required judges to provide the individual with at least three methods of 
posting bail from an authorized list of options.84 Previously, judges were 
permitted, though not required, to offer individuals multiple methods 
of posting bail,85 although multiple forms were rarely offered. Not only 
did the reforms mandate that judges fix at least three forms of bail, but 
they also required that judges select at least one of a partially secured 
surety bond86 or an unsecured surety bond87 as an option.88 The reforms 
retained earlier language that, when fixing multiple forms of bail, judges 
“may designate different amounts varying with the forms.”89  
 
 81 See infra Section I.B.2; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10. 
 82 See infra Section I.B.3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3-a) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 
1, 2020). 
 83 See infra Section I.B.4; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1). 
 84 The list of nine authorized forms of bail remained unchanged from the statute’s prior 
iteration. The authorized forms of bail are (a) cash bail, (b) insurance company bail bond, (c) 
secured surety bond, (d) secured appearance bond, (e) partially secured surety bond, (f) partially 
secured appearance bond, (g) unsecured surety bond, (h) unsecured appearance bond, and (i) 
credit card or similar device. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10. For definitions of each of the 
authorized forms of bail, see id. § 500.10. 
 85 Id. § 520.10(2)(b) (effective through Dec. 31, 2019). 
 86 A surety is “an obligor who is not a principal.” Id. § 500.10(12). A surety bond is “a bail 
bond in which the obligor or obligors consist of one or more sureties or of one or more sureties 
and the principal.” Id. § 500.10(15). That the bond is partially secured means that the surety’s 
up-front monetary deposit may not exceed ten percent of the total amount of the undertaking. 
Id. § 500.10(18). In simpler terms, a partially secured surety bond “allows defendants (or their 
friends or family) to pay 10 percent or less of the total bail amount up front; the balance is only 
paid if the defendant skips court.” 2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 4. 
 87 That the bond is unsecured means that it is “not secured by any deposit of or lien upon 
property.” N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(19). In non-statutory language, an unsecured bond 
functions similarly to a partially secured bond, except it does not require any up-front payment. 
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 4. 
 88 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b). 
 89 Id. 
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Previously, judges could fix bail with total disregard for the 
individual’s financial circumstances, without considering whether there 
was even a remote possibility that the individual could post bail.90 With 
the introduction of the reforms, judges, if fixing bail, now had to 
consider the individual’s financial circumstances and whether fixing 
bail would impose undue hardship on the individual.91  
3.     Nonmonetary Conditions of Release 
In conjunction with the institution of a presumption of release, the 
reforms introduced into law the concept of nonmonetary conditions as 
a method for securing the return to court of an individual deemed a risk 
of flight to avoid prosecution.92 Since the 2019 reforms made most 
misdemeanors ineligible for bail,93 when an individual was charged with 
a bail-ineligible misdemeanor, judges now possessed two options: (1) 
by default, release the individual on their own recognizance, or (2) if the 
individual is deemed a risk of flight to avoid prosecution, impose the 
least restrictive nonmonetary condition(s) that would reasonably assure 
the individual’s return to court.94 Excised from judges’ toolkits was the 
option to fix bail for this group of charged offenses.95  
 
 90 See id. § 510.30 (effective through Dec. 31, 2019). 
 91 In determining whether monetary bail would be the least restrictive condition that would 
reasonably assure the individual’s return to court, judges must consider “the principal’s 
individual financial circumstances, and, in cases where bail is authorized, the principal’s ability 
to post bail without posing undue hardship, as well as his or her ability to obtain a secured, 
unsecured, or partially secured bond.” Id. § 510.30(1)(f). 
 92 Id. § 510.10(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). 
 93 Id. § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). According to the Center for Court 
Innovation, the initial bail reforms “disallow[ed] money bail in almost all cases charged with a 
misdemeanor, with two exceptions: (1) sex offense misdemeanors, and (2) misdemeanor 
criminal contempt (PL 215.50) where there is an underlying allegation of domestic violence.” 
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 2. 
 94 The relevant statute reads as follows: 
In cases other than as described in subdivision four of this section the court shall 
release the principal pending trial on the principal’s own recognizance, unless the court 
finds on the record or in writing that release on the principal’s own recognizance will 
not reasonably assure the principal’s return to court. In such instances, the court shall 
release the principal under non-monetary conditions, selecting the least restrictive 
alternative and conditions that will reasonably assure the principal’s return to court. 
The court shall explain its choice of alternative and conditions on the record or in 
writing. 
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(3) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). 
 95 See id. 
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Even when an individual was charged with one of the dwindling 
number of qualifying offenses,96 judges retained the discretion to release 
the individual on their own recognizance.97 However, if a judge deemed 
an individual a risk of flight to avoid prosecution, that judge remained 
obligated to select the least restrictive condition that would reasonably 
assure that individual’s return to court.98 For those qualifying offenses, 
that least restrictive condition could be bail or it could be nonmonetary 
conditions if the judge thought them necessary to ensure the 
individual’s return to court.99 Only where the individual was charged 
with a qualifying felony could the judge consider remanding the 
individual to custody.100 Even in such cases, remand would only be 
appropriate if it were the least restrictive condition that would 
reasonably assure the individual’s return to court.101  
The reforms provided judges with a non-exhaustive list102 of 
nonmonetary conditions from which they could choose to impose any 
one, or a combination of conditions, the least restrictive of which would 
reasonably ensure the individual’s return to court.103 The statute 
 
 96 See id. § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (listing charged offenses for which 
a judge retained discretion to set bail or, for qualifying felonies, remand an individual to custody). 
The law establishes nine criteria where both money bail and remand remain 
permissible in felony cases, while also indicating a range of other options that should 
be considered in these cases, including release on the defendant’s own recognizance or 
non-monetary conditions such as pretrial supervision. As a practical matter, the nine 
criteria permit bail and detention with nearly all violent felonies but rule it out with 
nearly all nonviolent felonies. 
2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 2. 
 97 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(4) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). 
 98 Id. § 510.10(1). 
 99 Id. § 510.10(4). 
 100 Id. 
 101 Id. § 510.10(1) (effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (“If such a finding is made [that the 
individual poses a risk of flight to avoid prosecution], the court must select the least restrictive 
alternative and condition or conditions that will reasonably assure the principal’s return to 
court.”). 
 102 Before listing a series of possible conditions, the statute provides that “[s]uch conditions 
may include, among other conditions reasonable under the circumstances.” Id. § 500.10(3-a) 
(effective Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020) (emphasis added). 
 103 The text of the statute provides the following examples of nonmonetary conditions, among 
others not listed here: 
Such conditions may include, among other conditions reasonable under the 
circumstances: (1) that the principal be in contact with a pretrial services agency 
serving principals in that county; (2) that the principal abide by reasonable, specified 
restrictions on travel that are reasonably related to an actual risk of flight from the 
jurisdiction . . . ; (3) that the principal refrain from possessing a firearm, destructive 
device or other dangerous weapon; (4) that . . . the person be placed in reasonable 
pretrial supervision with a pretrial services agency serving principals in that 
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provided that the “principal shall not be required to pay for any part of 
the cost of release on non-monetary conditions.”104  
4.     “Activities and History” 
Lawmakers maintained the State’s status quo by withholding from 
judges the explicit authority to consider “dangerousness” or threat to 
public safety when making bail decisions.105 In fact, the revised statute 
added language that judges consider “information about the principal 
that is relevant to the principal’s return to court,”106 which had been 
absent from the statute’s previous iteration.107 Once a judge decided that 
an individual posed a risk of flight to avoid prosecution, that judge was 
now left with the task of determining which condition(s) would be the 
least restrictive to secure the individual’s return to court.108 To guide 
judges in this determination, the reforms provided a revised list of 
factors for judges to consider and take into account.109 While many of 
the factors remained substantively similar to the statute’s prior version, 
the reforms removed from consideration “[t]he principal’s character, 
reputation, habits and mental condition,”110 among other 
considerations, replacing them with “[t]he principal’s activities and 
history.”111  
 
county; . . . (5) that . . . the principal’s location be monitored with an approved 
electronic monitoring device. 
Id. (numbering added for clarity). 
 104 Id. 
 105 See infra Section II.A; Clark, supra note 76. The words “dangerousness,” “public,” and 
“safety” do not appear in the statute. See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1). 
 106 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1) (emphasis added). 
 107 See id. § 510.30 (effective Dec. 24, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2019). 
 108 Id. § 510.30. 
 109 Compare id. (effective Jan. 1, 2020), with id. (effective Dec. 24, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2019). 
 110 Id. § 510.30(2)(a)(i) (effective Dec. 24, 2012 to Dec. 31, 2019). 
 111 Id. § 510.30(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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C.     New York’s 2020 Amendments to the Reforms 
1.     Backlash to the 2019 Reforms 
New York’s bail reform saga did not end with the introduction of 
2019’s reforms.112 Although the reforms quickly reduced prison 
populations,113 they were met with severe pushback from various media 
outlets,114 from the New York Police Department (NYPD),115 and even 
directly from the New York City police commissioner.116 Local media 
seized on the story of a mentally ill Black woman who was rearrested 
upon being released without bail to conclude that the bail reforms had 
failed.117 If this style of dog-whistle-laden attack evokes decades-old 
 
 112 See generally Kim Bellware, Class Race and Geography Emerge as Flashpoints in New York’s 
Bail Reform Debate, WASH. POST (Feb. 15, 2020, 1:41 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
nation/2020/02/15/new-york-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/FR7M-US86]. 
 113 BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 12. 
 114 Local tabloids criticized the reforms as the source of a purported—though disputed—
crime uptick, writing incendiary, and sometimes outright false, headlines such as “Revolving 
Door Lunacy,” “No Bail Madness,” “The Feds Can’t Save New York from the Insane ‘No-Bail’ 
Law,’” and “Set Free to Rape: Suspect Busted in Train Station Sex Assault Was Freed Through 
State’s New Bail Reform Laws,” among countless others. Lartey, supra note 38; Laura Bennett, 
Media Must Focus News Coverage on Facts, Not on Fear, TIMES UNION (May 27, 2021, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.timesunion.com/opinion/article/Media-must-focus-news-coverage-on-facts-not-
on-16205702.php [https://perma.cc/8WXZ-LWLL]; Post Editorial Board, The Feds Can’t Save 
New York from the Insane ‘No-Bail’ Law, N.Y. POST (Jan. 28, 2020, 8:24 PM), https://nypost.com/
2020/01/28/the-feds-cant-save-new-york-from-the-insane-no-bail-law [https://perma.cc/KXP7-
LM5H]. 
 115 Coinciding with the start of the new year and the implementation of these reforms was a 
reported crime increase. NYPD reported a 22.5% crime increase in February 2020 and exclaimed 
that “[c]riminal justice reforms serve as a significant reason New York City has seen this uptick 
in crime.” NYPD Announces Citywide Crime Statistics for February 2020, N.Y. POLICE DEP’T 
(Mar. 5, 2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/news/pr0305/nypd-citywide-crime-statistics-
february-2020 [https://perma.cc/932D-BZRV]. However, criminal justice reform advocates and 
experts expressed skepticism, explaining that the number of arraignments had decreased by 
twenty percent, which “starkly contradict[s] claims by the New York Police Department that 
crime has risen since the new bail law went into effect on January 1, 2020.” Erin Durkin, NYPD, 
de Blasio Blame Bail Reform for Crime Spike as Defenders Question Police Stats, POLITICO (Mar. 
5, 2020, 6:41 PM), https://www.politico.com/states/new-york/albany/story/2020/03/05/nypd-
reports-spike-in-crime-as-public-defenders-question-the-stats-1265616 [https://perma.cc/
86K7-BEXG]. 
 116 In response to the passage of the reforms, New York City Police Commissioner Dermot 
Shea penned an op-ed in the New York Times in which he stoked fear in the community, making 
dubious claims that the reforms “present a significant challenge to public safety” and that 
“[v]iolent criminals are being returned to the community.” Dermot Shea, New York’s New Bail 
Laws Harm Public Safety, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 23, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/23/
opinion/shea-nypd-bail-reform.html [https://perma.cc/YA38-YK43]. 
 117 On December 27, 2019, amid a spate of anti-Semitic hate crimes, Tiffany Harris, a thirty-
year-old Black woman from Brooklyn suffering from mental health issues, allegedly physically 
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memories, it might not be a coincidence.118 Specifically, parallels 
abound with the 1988 United States presidential election, when a 
George H.W. Bush–backing political action committee ran the 
notorious “Willie Horton ad”119 as a way of attacking Democratic 
nominee Michael Dukakis and his views on criminal justice.120 In each 
 
slapped and yelled slurs at a group of Orthodox Jewish women. Harris was arrested and charged 
with attempted assault as a hate crime. Woman Charged with Hate Crime Amid NYC Anti-Semitic 
Attacks, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Dec. 28, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/
8fab4c32e88141001024c2d6a8467eda [https://perma.cc/Z4WL-4N86]. Just days in advance of 
the bail reforms taking effect, Harris was released without bail. Id. The next day, while out on 
bail, Harris allegedly assaulted another victim. NYC Woman Accused of Anti-Semitic Attacks 
Arrested Again a Day After Release, NBC N.Y. (Dec. 30, 2019, 3:18 AM), 
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/nyc-woman-accused-of-anti-semitic-attacks-
arrested-again-a-day-after-release/2252361 [https://perma.cc/83C3-XUJQ]. Harris was again 
released without bail and was again rearrested, this time for failure to comply with the court-
imposed nonmonetary conditions of her release. Rebecca Rosenberg, Paul Martinka, Reuven 
Fenton & Laura Italiano, Hate Crime Suspect Tiffany Harris Arrested for Third Time in One Week, 
N.Y. POST (Jan. 1, 2020, 9:02 AM), https://nypost.com/2020/01/01/hate-crime-suspect-tiffany-
harris-arrested-for-third-time-in-three-days [https://perma.cc/B5DL-A56Y]. Local media 
outlets were quick to vilify the brand new reforms, calling them “soft on crime” and 
“troublesome.” See, e.g., Andrew Denney, Emily Saul & Rebecca Rosenberg, Tiffany Harris 
Indicted on Felony Hate-Crime Charges—but Still Won’t Face Bail, N.Y. POST (Jan. 14, 2020, 10:06 
PM), https://nypost.com/2020/01/14/tiffany-harris-indicted-on-felony-hate-crime-charges-but-
still-wont-face-bail [https://perma.cc/WNJ2-QJGA]. 
 118 Per Vincent M. Southerland, “[r]acist [f]earmongering . . . is among the strongest tools in 
the anti-reform toolbox.” Vincent M. Southerland, The Racist Fearmongering Campaigns Against 
Bail Reform, Explained, APPEAL (June 7, 2021), https://theappeal.org/the-lab/explainers/the-
racist-fearmongering-campaigns-against-bail-reform-explained [https://perma.cc/43KZ-
XRTE]. Southerland writes that “[e]xamples abound” of this sort of racist fearmongering: 
Richard Nixon’s racially coded law and order presidential campaign, George H.W. 
Bush’s use of Willie Horton to portray Michael Dukakis as soft on crime, Bill Clinton’s 
tough-on-crime campaign messaging, and Donald Trump’s embrace of law 
enforcement and harsh criminal and immigration system policies are the legacies of 
centuries-old attitudes rooted in white anxiety and fear. The debunked 
“superpredator” myth, which produced a wave of death in prison sentences for youth, 
is another. 
Id. See generally Rachel Withers, George H.W. Bush’s “Willie Horton” Ad Will Always Be the 
Reference Point for Dog-Whistle Racism, VOX (Dec. 1, 2018, 4:10 PM), https://www.vox.com/
2018/12/1/18121221/george-hw-bush-willie-horton-dog-whistle-politics [https://perma.cc/
6AAX-QVR3]. 
 119 National Security PAC, Willie Horton 1988 Attack Ad, YOUTUBE (Nov. 4, 2008), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Io9KMSSEZ0Y [https://perma.cc/8ZU2-BMXJ]. See 
generally Jon Schuppe, Fair or Dangerous? Days After Ending Cash Bail, New York Has Second 
Thoughts, NBC NEWS (Jan. 7, 2020, 4:30 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/
fair-or-dangerous-days-after-ending-cash-bail-new-york-n1111346 [https://perma.cc/J7DA-
R6P7]. 
 120 William Horton is a Black man from South Carolina who had been convicted, and was 
serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, for a murder he committed in 1974. In 
1986, Horton was furloughed from a Massachusetts prison to which he never returned. In 1987, 
Horton raped a woman and stabbed her fiancé, before he was apprehended. Dukakis, then-
governor of Massachusetts, supported the furlough program. Bush supporters leveraged 
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instance, detractors of progressive criminal justice policy relentlessly 
parroted the case involving a single Black individual to demonstrate the 
policy’s shortcomings. Then, as now, the unfortunate exception to 
progress made in the criminal justice arena was leveraged as an attack 
on the movement as a whole.121 
The vocal pushback to the new reforms precipitated amendments 
to those reforms. Detailed in the following Section, these amendments 
would be, in essence, rollbacks of the initial reforms, reining in New 
York’s criminal justice system closer to where it stood before the April 
2019 reforms.122 The Legislature’s hedge of rolling back the reforms—
but only partially so—pulled off the remarkable feat of dissatisfying 
advocates on both sides of the ever-polarized bail debate, alike.123 
2.     Rollbacks of the 2019 Reforms 
Before detailing how the amendments altered the initial reforms, 
it is worth highlighting the key components of the reforms that 
remained intact.124 Fundamental to the reforms, the amendments 
retained the presumption of release.125 When determining the least 
restrictive conditions to secure an individual’s return to court, judges 
must still consider an individual’s “activities and history.”126 And before 
concluding that bail would indeed be the least restrictive condition, 
judges must still consider any undue hardship fixing bail would pose 
due to the individual’s financial circumstances.127 When fixing bail is 
the least restrictive condition for a qualifying offense, judges must still 
 
Dukakis’s position to create the inflammatory ad, “insinuat[ing] [that], if you elect Governor 
Dukakis as president, we’re going to have black rapists running amok in the country.” 
Race2012pbs, 1988: Willie Horton Ad, YOUTUBE, at 0:50 (Oct. 10, 2012), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwWbkb-TKho [https://perma.cc/FH94-AJK6]. See 
generally Beth Schwartzapfel & Bill Keller, Willie Horton Revisited: We Talk to the Man Who 
Became Our National Nightmare. Thirty Years Later, Does He Still Matter?, MARSHALL PROJECT 
(May 13, 2015, 6:37 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/05/13/willie-horton-
revisited [https://perma.cc/Z7UL-HPJ7]. Dukakis would go on to lose the 1988 election to Bush. 
See generally Monte Piliawsky, Racial Politics in the 1988 Presidential Election, 20 BLACK 
SCHOLAR 30 (1989). 
 121 See Doug Criss, This Is the 30-Year-Old Willie Horton Ad Everybody Is Talking About 
Today, CNN (Nov. 1, 2018, 6:17 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/11/01/politics/willie-horton-
ad-1988-explainer-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/H8XF-3YJW]. 
 122 Lartey, supra note 38; Fertig, supra note 38. 
 123 “And while advocates were crushed by the setback, the move was still insufficient for the 
most fervent opponents of the law.” Lartey, supra note 38. 
 124 See generally BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37. 
 125 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1) (McKinney 2020). 
 126 Id. § 510.30(1)(a). 
 127 Id. § 510.30(1)(f). 
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offer it in at least three forms.128 In an attempt to ensure that indigent 
people can afford bail, at least one of those forms must still be a partially 
secured surety bond or an unsecured surety bond.129 Spared from 
revision throughout both the 2019 reforms and the 2020 amendments 
was the language that judges “may designate different amounts varying 
with the forms” of bail they decide to fix.130 
On April 3, 2020, the Legislature enacted various amendments to 
the bail reforms. Two amendments in particular hinder the progress 
made in reducing economic inequality in New York’s pretrial system.131 
First, the amendments expanded the list of qualifying offenses, allowing 
judges to fix bail in a wider array of cases.132 Misdemeanors and 
nonviolent felonies, such as bail jumping or financial crimes, were 
relabeled qualifying offenses—a category that had previously included 
mainly violent felonies.133 In many instances, these were the very same 
misdemeanors and nonviolent offenses that were deemed non-
qualifying offenses just months earlier.134 
Additionally, the amendments altered the definition of 
nonmonetary conditions, expanding the enunciated list of 
nonmonetary conditions from which judges could select. Among the 
added nonmonetary conditions were restrictions on who the individual 
could associate with, various forms of mandatory programming, and 
orders of protection.135 While judges were already required to select the 
least restrictive conditions that would “reasonably assure the principal’s 
 
 128 Id. § 520.10(2)(b). 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. 
 131 The amendments, which were certain to increase prison and pretrial populations, were 
signed into law in the heart of the COVID-19 pandemic in which jails and prisons were 
particularly rampant hotspots for the virus. See, e.g., Beth Schwartzapfel, Katie Park & Andrew 
Demillo, 1 in 5 Prisoners in the U.S. Has Had COVID-19, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 18, 2020, 
6:00 AM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2020/12/18/1-in-5-prisoners-in-the-u-s-has-
had-covid-19 [https://perma.cc/C3QC-U84B]; Nick Pinto, Amid Coronavirus Crisis, Andrew 
Cuomo Held New York’s Health Care Hostage to Undo Criminal Justice Reforms, INTERCEPT (Apr. 
3, 2020, 3:06 PM), https://theintercept.com/2020/04/03/andrew-cuomo-coronavirus-bail-
criminal-justice [https://perma.cc/5Q2A-7XXK]. 
 132 BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 2–5. 
 133 Id. 
 134 The Center for Court Innovation estimated that the amendments to the reforms would 
have led to an additional six thousand individuals eligible for bail based on 2019 arraignment 
data. Id. at 8. 
 135 Compare N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 500.10(3-a) (effective July 2, 2020), with id. (effective 
Jan. 1, 2020 to July 1, 2020). 
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return to court,” the amendments added that those conditions must also 
“reasonably assure the principal’s compliance with court conditions.”136  
II.     ANALYSIS 
This Part will parse the goals of the New York State Legislature in 
enacting the various reforms to its Criminal Procedure Law137 and 
outline the ways in which these laws in their current state fail to achieve 
their intended purpose of reducing economic inequality in the State’s 
pretrial detention system.138 The reformed and amended bail laws fall 
short of their goals because they allow judges to retain discretion in two 
troublesome ways. First, judges’ discretion in setting the amounts of 
partially secured surety and appearance bonds inhibits the decrease in 
pretrial detention,139 and second, imprecise criteria allow judges to 
retain the discretion to weave public safety and “dangerousness” into 
bail decisions,140 each of which disparately impacts less-wealthy 
individuals. 
“As a general rule, words used in Penal Law and Criminal 
Procedure Law are to be given their usual ordinary and commonly 
accepted meaning.”141 Legislative provisions governing bail must be 
related to proper purposes for detention of defendants prior to 
conviction and judicial applications of discretion authorized by the 
Legislature must be similarly related.142 
A.     The Legislature’s Intent 
Since 1971, judges in New York have not been permitted to 
consider a criminal defendant’s threat to public safety or 
“dangerousness” when making decisions on bail or other pretrial 
 
 136 The meaning of this seemingly circular language is not clear and has not yet been 
interpreted by courts. See id. (effective July 2, 2020). The Center for Court Innovation 
understands that “one plausible interpretation is that a judge may add further conditions, so long 
as they aid someone’s ability to comply with the judge’s initial, minimum conditions.” BAIL 
REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 5 (emphasis added). 
 137 See infra Section II.A. 
 138 See infra Sections II.B–II.C. 
 139 See infra Section II.B. 
 140 See infra Section II.C. 
 141 People v. Chensky, 120.N.Y.S.3d 621, 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2020); accord People v. King, 463 
N.E.2d 601, 603 (N.Y. 1984); People v. Munoz, 615 N.Y.S.2d 730, 731 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 1994). 
 142 People ex rel. LaForce v. Skinner, 319 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1971); Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d 
621. 
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conditions.143 Unlike most of the United States,144 and unlike the 
provisions set forth in the 1984 Federal Bail Reform Act,145 public safety 
and dangerousness have not been written into New York law as 
potential considerations for judges.146 Although the Eighth 
Amendment’s bail clause has never been construed to prohibit 
considerations of public safety and dangerousness,147 and although the 
United States Supreme Court has deemed constitutional the 
consideration of dangerousness in pretrial detention decisions,148 
legislative and judicial history in New York show public safety and 
dangerousness have, in fact, been uniquely excluded from consideration 
by judges in New York.149  
 
 143 “[S]ince 1971, public safety—the idea of the ‘potential dangerousness’ of someone accused 
of a crime—has not been a legal reason to set bail for a defendant in New York.” Asgarian, supra 
note 54. 
 144 New York is one of only four states in the United States (Connecticut, Mississippi, and 
Missouri being the others) that does not allow its judges to consider public safety and 
dangerousness when making bail decisions. CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 
1; PHILLIPS, supra note 50, at 25. 
 145 Although the federal Bail Reform Act of 1966 did not allow judges to consider public safety 
when making bail decisions in noncapital cases, the Bail Reform Act of 1984, which amended the 
1966 law, allowed judges to do just that. Patricia M. Wald & Daniel J. Freed, The Bail Reform Act 
of 1966: A Practitioner’s Primer, 52 A.B.A. J. 940, 940 (1966) (“In two major respects the [1966] 
act falls short of completely revising the old bail system: it does not authorize courts to consider 
danger to the community in setting conditions of pretrial release in noncapital cases; and, while it 
subordinates, it fails to eliminate money as a condition which can cause the detention of persons 
unable to raise it.”) (emphasis added); CHARLES DOYLE, BAIL: AN OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL 
CRIMINAL LAW 4–5 (2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40221.pdf [https://perma.cc/98YL-
SY93] (“In 1984, Congress amended federal bail law to permit the use of preventive detention in 
certain limited instances when the accused posed a danger to the public or particular members 
of the public.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3142. 
 146 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1) (McKinney 2020). 
 147 “Nothing in the text of the Bail Clause limits permissible Governmental considerations 
solely to questions of flight. The only arguable substantive limitation of the Bail Clause is that the 
Government’s proposed conditions of release or detention not be ‘excessive’ in light of the 
perceived evil.” SCHNACKE, JONES & BROOKER, supra note 40, at 18. 
 148 See United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 747–49 (1987) (upholding as a legitimate 
regulatory goal in making pretrial detention decisions the consideration of preventing danger to 
the community). 
 149 See, e.g., CTR. ON THE ADMIN. OF CRIM. L., supra note 42, at 15 (“Noticeably absent [from 
section 510.30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure adopted in 1970] was the language from the 
Temporary Commission’s 1968 study bill that would have allowed the judge to consider whether 
a defendant ‘would be a danger to society or himself at liberty during the pendency of the action 
or proceeding.’”); People ex rel. Lobell v. McDonnell, 71 N.E.2d 423, 425 (N.Y. 1947) (“The 
bailing court has a large discretion, but it is a judicial, not a pure or unfettered discretion. The 
case calls for a fact determination, not a mere fiat. The factual matters to be taken into account 
include: ‘[t]he nature of the offense, the penalty, which may be imposed, the probability of the 
willing appearance of the defendant or his flight to avoid punishment, the pecuniary and social 
condition of defendant and his general reputation and character, and the apparent nature and 
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In New York, the sole purpose of pretrial conditions like bail has 
been to ensure that a criminal defendant returns to court at a future 
date.150 Even amid the turbulence surrounding New York’s bail laws in 
recent years—and around the consideration of public safety, in 
particular—this remains the case today.151 When Governor Cuomo 
embarked on revamping New York’s bail system, he opted not to 
propose introducing public safety into the equation of judges’ bail 
decision-making.152 Thus far, the Legislature has maintained the status 
quo on that front.153  
In Governor Cuomo’s 2019 Justice Agenda, Cuomo expressly 
prioritized bail and pretrial detention reform, with the specific goal of 
removing a defendant’s wealth as a factor impacting their pretrial 
status.154 Democratic state leadership echoed Cuomo’s goals,155 as did 
Cuomo’s executive proposal submitted to the New York Senate and 
 
strength of the proof as bearing on the probability of his conviction.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
 150 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10. 
 151 See id. 
 152 “New York is one of only four states in the nation that does not allow public safety to 
be taken into consideration in release and bail decisions. This approach means people 
in New York who do not present a risk to public safety, but cannot afford bail, are 
detained while those who may present a risk to public safety can post bail and gain 
release. As part of the Governor’s Justice Agenda, legislation submitted with the 
Budget will end cash bail so that no one is detained because they cannot afford the cost 
of bail.” 
ANDREW CUOMO, FY 2020 EXECUTIVE BUDGET 130 (2019). 
 153 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10. 
 154 “Governor Cuomo is advancing legislation that will end cash bail once and for all, 
significantly reduce the number of people held in jail pretrial, and ensure due process 
for anyone awaiting trial behind bars. Right now, money stands in the way of freedom 
for too many presumed-innocent New Yorkers. . . . [T]he legislation will eliminate 
money as a means of deciding who is free and who is not. Instead, people will be 
released first on their own recognizance, or, only if the judge makes necessary findings, 
under pretrial conditions. . . . This legislation will protect the rights of presumed 
innocent people to remain free before trial, with as few conditions of release as 
possible, reserving detention as the carefully determined exception rather than the 
rule.” 
2019 JUSTICE AGENDA, supra note 15, at 140–42. 
 155 Speaker Carl Heastie explained that “[w]ealth should not determine whether a person, 
accused but not convicted of a crime, will be jailed while awaiting trial. The budget reforms New 
York State’s bail system by . . . substituting release on recognizance or on non-monetary 
conditions when appropriate.” Press Release, Carl E. Heastie, Assemb. Speaker, SFY 19-20 
Budget Includes Critical Criminal Justice Reform Legislation and Funding (Apr. 1, 2019), 
https://nyassembly.gov/Press/files/20190401a.php [https://perma.cc/3LT2-B7RQ]. 
Assemblymember Latrice Walker added, “Every year, thousands of New Yorkers are incarcerated 
awaiting trial because of unreasonably high bail that is impossible for most minority families to 
meet. But change is upon us. . . . This budget will reassure New Yorkers that in this state, justice 
is not for sale.” Id. 
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Assembly in January 2019.156 Although Cuomo’s initial vision of 
removing the use of bail altogether did not come to fruition, and 
although New York courts have acknowledged Cuomo’s intent,157 the 
bail reforms that Cuomo would later sign into law fail to achieve the 
semi-aspirational ends he preached from the onset of his efforts.  
B.     Prohibitively High Partially Secured or Unsecured Bonds 
On first glance, the reformed provisions guiding how judges fix 
bail appear to reduce economic inequality in New York’s pretrial 
system. After all, judges now must offer individuals at least three 
options for posting bail, upped from two in the law’s previous 
iteration.158 And at least one of those three options must be a partially 
secured surety bond or unsecured surety bond,159 regarded as “two of 
the least onerous forms of bail.”160 Even further, judges now must 
consider whether fixing bail would impose an undue financial hardship 
on the individual.161 These are all positive, if not necessary, steps to 
reducing economic inequality in the pretrial criminal justice system.  
However, one provision in the bail statutes—a provision that 
preceded these most recent reform efforts—has managed to survive 
iteration after iteration of the law. That is, that judges “may designate 
different amounts varying with the forms” of bail that judges choose to 
 
 156 S. 1505, 2019–2020 Leg. Sess., Part AA (N.Y. 2019), https://legislation.nysenate.gov/pdf/
bills/2019/s1505 [https://perma.cc/8Y6V-UEJD] (“This state, like most across the United States, 
has for far too long needlessly incarcerated those meant to be guaranteed a presumption of 
innocence simply because of an inability to pay bail and have forced those same people to choose 
between facing lengthy prison sentences or a speedy return to society without providing them 
with sufficient information regarding the case against them. This Part will usher into New York 
true reforms in the areas of bail . . . . [T]he bill breaks the link between paying money and earning 
freedom, so that defendants are either released on their own recognizance or, failing that, released 
under non-monetary conditions.”). In a Memorandum in Support of the FY 2020 New York State 
Executive Budget, the reforms to bail and pretrial detention were summarized as follows: “New 
York’s current bail system fails to recognize that freedom before trial should be the rule, not the 
exception, and by tying freedom to money, it has created a two-tiered system that puts an unfair 
burden on the economically disadvantaged.” MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF FY 2020 NEW YORK 
STATE EXECUTIVE BUDGET 39 (2019), https://www.budget.ny.gov/pubs/archive/fy20/exec/artvii/
ppgg-artvii-ms.pdf [https://perma.cc/6RAW-QUQ2]. 
 157 See, e.g., People v. Steininger, 117 N.Y.S.3d 512, 521 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (“[T]he bail reform 
law was also designed to significantly reduce disparities based on wealth and reduce pretrial 
incarceration in any case where a court chose to set monetary bail.”). 
 158 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b). 
 159 Id. 
 160 See 2019 BAIL REFORM IN NEW YORK, supra note 16, at 4. 
 161 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1)(f). 
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fix.162 That the Legislature retained this pesky language removes the 
decision whether to take the step of reducing pretrial inequality from 
the hands of the Legislature and drops it squarely on the shoulders of 
New York supreme court or criminal court judges.  
Although judges are prohibited from setting “excessive” bail, they 
retain otherwise limitless leeway in designating the dollar amount of 
bail and the difference in amount between each option.163 For example, 
it is not uncommon for judges to set cash bail, secured or partially 
secured surety, and appearance bonds all at the same time, although 
judges rarely opt to set unsecured bonds.164 The statute provides no 
guidance on how the amount for each of these methods should compare 
to one another.165 Thus, judges set surety or appearance bonds that 
exceed the amount of cash bail.166 Some argue that one reason for this 
disparity is that unsecured bonds provide little incentive for the 
individual to return to court,167 even though an individual out on an 
unsecured bond who fails to return to court will be liable for the entirety 
of the often-exorbitant unsecured bond. A common result of 
prohibitively high partially secured or unsecured bonds, then, is that 
defendants are unable to meet any of the methods, resulting in their 
pretrial detention. This all-too-common result flies in the face of the 
very purpose of this newly added section of the bail laws.168  
 
 162 Id. § 520.10(2)(b). This language has been embedded within the statute since the modern 
statutory bail scheme was enacted in 1971. 
 163 See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 752 (1987). 
 164 See Akash Mehta, A Broken Bond: How New York Judges Are Getting Around Bail Reform, 
CITY (Oct. 12, 2020, 4:00 AM), https://www.thecity.nyc/2020/10/12/21512018/new-york-judges-
getting-around-bail-reform-bond [https://perma.cc/6JCR-CLSJ] (“But since the mandate took 
effect Jan. 1, judges across New York have seldom used one of these bail forms, ‘unsecured 
bonds,’ and have set the other, [partially secured bonds], at dramatically higher rates than 
traditional bail.”). 
 165 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10(2)(b). 
 166 According to the Office of Court Administration, judges in Brooklyn Criminal Court have 
only set unsecured bonds in 0.3% of cases, and partially secured bonds were on average set 140% 
of the commercial bond amount and 268% of the cash bail amount. Citywide data collected by 
New York County Defender Services and Court Watch NYC show that partially secured bonds 
are set on average at 144% of commercial bonds and 232% of cash bail. Mehta, supra note 164. 
 167 For example, one New York Supreme Court judge wrote that 
[w]here . . . a defendant is indigent or has very limited means, an unsecured bond 
provides defendant with little incentive to return to court. In such a case the defendant 
knows that if he or she fails to return to court as required, the amount of the unsecured 
bond likely cannot ever be collected as a practical matter. 
People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514, 525 (Sup. Ct. 2019). 
 168 Assemblymember Latrice Walker, a sponsor of the 2019 bail reforms, remarked, “What 
that sounds like is an unequal administration of justice.” Mehta, supra note 164. Unequal 
administration of justice is the precise problem the reforms were intended to combat. 
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Although the purpose of requiring judges to fix partially secured 
bonds is to make it more likely that an individual can post bail, thereby 
decreasing the pretrial prison population and removing wealth from the 
equation, by setting prohibitively high partially secured bonds, judges 
can make it even less likely that a less-wealthy individual can post bail. 
Providing multiple methods of bail is intended to increase the 
likelihood that one such method will work for a defendant, meaning 
they can remain free during the pendency of their trial, all while the 
court can ensure that the individual will show up when needed because 
of what the defendant has placed at risk. Placing this burden on judges 
who are not necessarily committed to the same goals as the Legislature 
has proved ineffective.169 Three examples illustrate this failure of the 
revised bail law to make it more likely that an individual can avoid 
pretrial detention while ensuring that they return to court: (1) the case 
of J.S.,170 (2) the case of an unnamed defendant,171 and (3) People v. 
Chensky.172  
1.     The Case of J.S. 
After J.S. was arrested in April 2020, a Bronx judge set cash bail at 
$30,000 and a partially secured bond at $50,000.173 J.S. and his family 
were unable to cobble together $30,000 to pay cash bail.174 That left just 
the partially secured bond, which meant J.S.’s family would have to 
provide the court with a ten percent refundable deposit—in this case, 
$5,000—to secure J.S.’s release. J.S.’s girlfriend managed to come up 
with the money, but J.S. remained in jail for a month as the judge 
required J.S.’s girlfriend to provide complicated paperwork to prove her 
income before the bond was approved.175 In all, J.S. remained in jail for 
six months following his arrest in the midst of the COVID-19 
pandemic, even though he remained legally innocent.176  
Even though J.S. and his family ultimately posted the partially 
secured bond, J.S. spent six months in jail during a deadly pandemic for 
 
 169 “Judges have ‘defeated the intent of the Legislature by setting the [partially secured bond] 
amount so high that no one can post it,’ said Timothy Donaher, the chief public defender of 
Monroe County.” Mehta, supra note 164. 
 170 See infra Section II.B.1; Mehta, supra note 164. 
 171 See infra Section II.B.2; Mehta, supra note 164. 
 172 See infra Section II.B.3; People v. Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d 621 (Sup. Ct. 2020). 
 173 Presumably, a third unreachable form of bail was fixed to abide by the statute. See Mehta, 
supra note 164. 
 174 Id. 
 175 Id. 
 176 Id. 
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no reason other than the fact that the court hesitated to approve the 
bond, given his family’s precarious financial position.177 Although a 
partially secured bond has the potential to make the lives of families like 
J.S.’s easier after a family member is arrested, that has not borne out in 
reality when the partially secured bonds are set so much higher than 
cash bail and when the individual and their family lack financial means. 
While judges are now somewhat restrained in how many and which 
types of bail they may fix, they retain complete discretion in the actual 
bail amounts.178 That discretion leads to cases like J.S.’s, in which less-
wealthy individuals spend months on end in jail awaiting trial as a direct 
consequence of their lack of financial means, while wealthier 
individuals make bail and retain some semblance of freedom.179  
2.     The Case of an Unnamed Defendant 
In January 2020, an unnamed man—let us refer to him as John—
was arrested.180 In September 2020, a Queens Supreme Court judge 
fixed three forms of bail for John’s release as follows: (1) $75,000 cash 
bail; (2) $75,000 insurance company bond; and (3) $750,000 partially 
secured bond.181 John could not make cash bail.182 His family could not 
afford the nonrefundable ten percent fee—$7,500—that accompanied 
the insurance company bond.183 That left the partially secured bond, 
specifically enumerated in the statute as one of two required options for 
judges, since it is typically a less onerous form of bail. However, at that 
amount, it would require an up-front refundable deposit of $75,000—
the same amount as cash bail, although riskier in comparison. John and 
his family could not post the partially secured bond.184 Thus, John 
remained in jail pending trial for nothing more than his lack of financial 
wealth.185  
 
 177 Id. 
 178 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 520.10 (McKinney 2020). 
 179 “By setting [partially secured bonds] at rates unaffordable for many defendants, criminal 
justice advocates and public defenders say, judges, who have complete discretion, have in effect 
nullified a program instituted by the legislature to free more poor people from jail.” Mehta, supra 
note 164. 
 180 See id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Id. 
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3.     People v. Chensky 
On January 15, 2020, Joseph Chensky was arrested and charged 
with two separate counts of Grand Larceny in the Fourth Degree.186 
Neither of these felonies qualified for bail under the reformed bail 
law.187 The court released Chensky on his own recognizance.188 Twelve 
days later, Chensky failed to appear for his court date.189 Another week 
later, Chensky again failed to appear.190 As a result, the court issued a 
bench warrant for Chensky’s arrest, and Chensky was rearrested on 
February 7.191 Chensky’s “persistent” and “willful” failures to appear 
rendered his offense bail-eligible.192 Under the statute instructing judges 
on fixing bail, the court set cash bail at $10,000, bond at $30,000,193 and 
unsecured surety bond at an exorbitant $300,000.194 The court satisfied 
the requirements of the statute by fixing at least three forms of bail and 
by fixing either an unsecured surety bond or a partially secured surety 
bond.  
It is unclear whether Chensky was able to post any of these three 
forms of bail. However, especially given the nature of the charged 
offenses, it would be no surprise to learn that Chensky did not have a 
spare $10,000 cash laying around or that he and his family lacked the 
nonrefundable $3,000 deposit due to a bail bond company. That left just 
the $300,000 unsecured bond, which would only become due upon 
Chensky’s failure to appear in court. Detractors of the unsecured bond 
would argue it provides no incentive to return to court, as it would be 
difficult to collect the amount from an individual who fails to appear 
and who may be judgment-proof, although wages can be garnished over 
 
 186 People v. Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d 621, 622 (Sup. Ct. 2020). 
 187 Id. 
 188 Id. 
 189 Id. at 622. 
 190 Id. at 623. 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 623–24; see also N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.60(2)(b) (McKinney 2020) 
(“[W]henever in the course of a criminal action or proceeding a defendant charged with the 
commission of an offense is at liberty as a result of an order of recognizance, release under non-
monetary conditions or bail issued pursuant to this article it shall be grounds for revoking such 
order and fixing bail in such criminal action or proceeding when the court has found, by clear 
and convincing evidence, that the defendant persistently and willfully failed to appear after notice 
of scheduled appearances in the case before the court . . . .”). 
 193 Although the decision does not specify, for the sake of this analysis, I assume this refers to 
an insurance company bail bond for which Chensky would need to pay a commercial bail bond 
company a ten percent nonrefundable fee of three thousand dollars to secure his release. 
 194 Chensky, 120 N.Y.S.3d at 624. 
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time, for example, to satisfy an unsecured bond that has become due.195 
Taking that as fact for the sake of argument, none of the three forms of 
bail fixed by the judge in Chensky would reasonably assure that he 
would return to court in the future, which is, after all, the sole reason 
that bail exists in New York.196  
C.     The Meaning of “Activities and History” 
Although legislative history tells us that New York judges may not 
consider “dangerousness” or risk to public safety when making bail 
decisions,197 the actual language of New York’s reformed bail law fails 
to send the same message.198 Conspicuously absent from the bail law is 
any mention of public safety or dangerousness.199 In its stead is the 
phrase “activities and history,” as in, judges must take into account an 
individual’s “activities and history” when determining the least 
restrictive conditions necessary to secure the individual’s return to 
court.200 However, neither the phrase as a whole, nor the individual 
words “activities” or “history,” are defined by the statute.201 
Notwithstanding the legislative history, these vague, amorphous words 
forming this vague, amorphous phrase give judges carte blanche to 
consider just about anything they can think up when determining the 
least restrictive conditions necessary to secure an individual’s return to 
court.  
Further, this provision of the bail law appears to be non-exhaustive 
in nature. The statute provides that when determining the least 
restrictive conditions, judges must consider factors “including” those 
enumerated in the statute.202 The use of the term “including” indicates 
that judges may look outside the corners of the statute and consult other 
factors for further guidance on making these bail decisions.203 Without 
 
 195 See, e.g., People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514, 525–26 (Sup. Ct. 2019). 
 196 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10. 
 197 See supra Section II.A. 
 198 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1). 
 199 See id. 
 200 See id. § 510.30(1)(a). 
 201 The provision of the bail law that defines terms does not define these particular terms. See 
id. § 500.10. The provision setting forth judges’ instructions for determining the least restrictive 
conditions also fails to define these terms. See id. § 510.30. Black’s Law Dictionary is not 
particularly instructive, defining “activity” as “[t]he collective acts of one person or of two or 
more people engaged in a common enterprise.” Activity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). Black’s Law Dictionary does not define the term “history.” 
 202 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.30(1) (emphasis added). 
 203 See People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514, 520–22 (Sup. Ct. 2019) (analyzing the meaning 
of the revisions to this provision of the statute). 
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much guidance, then, on what judges may or may not consider beyond 
the statute’s list of factors, judges have yet another opportunity to read 
into the statute whether an individual is a risk to public safety.204  
The Legislature attempted to clear these muddied waters by adding 
to the bail law that judges “shall explain [their] choice of release, release 
with conditions, bail or remand on the record or in writing.”205 In some 
cases, judges have provided thorough reasoning,206 while, in others, the 
explanation is sorely lacking.207 Ultimately, even with this requirement, 
it can be difficult to parse a judge’s reasoning behind bail decisions, and 
it can be even more difficult to discern whether those decisions 
accounted for “dangerousness” or public safety, whether intentionally 
or implicitly. With that in mind, recent examples help to highlight this 
ambiguity. 
1.     People v. Connon 
In People v. Connon, Connon had been charged with Criminal 
Obstruction of Breathing and Endangering the Welfare of a Child, 
neither of which is a qualifying offense per se under the reformed bail 
law.208 However, since this particular incident was allegedly directed 
against a member of Connon’s family or household, it became bail-
eligible.209 Thus, the judge was tasked with determining the least 
 
 204 Judge Greenberg succinctly summarizes this difficulty in his Portoreal opinion: 
On the one hand, the statute’s directive that the court consider—without any express 
limitation—information that is “relevant” to the defendant’s return to court certainly 
appears to be a broad and elastic “catch-all” provision that permits the court to 
consider any factor the court deems relevant to the question whether the defendant is 
likely to return to court. Yet, on the other hand, the use of the word “including” in 
Revised CPL § 510.30(1)(a) makes the meaning of the Revised Bail Law unclear. 
Id. at 521. 
 205 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1). 
 206 See, e.g., People v. Brown, 129 N.Y.S.3d 298, 303–04 (Cnty. Ct. 2020); Portoreal, 116 
N.Y.S.3d at 524–25. 
 207 See, e.g., People v. Connon, 136 N.Y.S.3d 844, 849 (City Ct. 2020) (explaining in a single 
sentence that “the defendant’s three prior felony convictions and prior probation delinquency 
convince[] the Court that bail is the least restrictive method for securing the defendant’s return 
to Court notwithstanding other factors militating in favor of his release on lesser restrictions”); 
People v. Hood, No. CR-1395-20, 2020 WL 1672425, at *1 (N.Y. City Ct. Apr. 4, 2020) (“After 
determining that Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree is a qualifying offense 
for purposes of New York’s bail statute, and after reviewing the relevant statutory factors, I also 
concluded that bail is the least restrictive kind and degree of control or restriction necessary to 
secure Defendant’s return to court when required.” (internal citations omitted)). 
 208 Connon, 136 N.Y.S.3d at 846. 
 209 Id. at 846–47. 
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restrictive conditions that would ensure Connon’s return to court.210 
After considering the statutory factors, including, of course, Connon’s 
“activities and history,” the judge decided to fix monetary bail.211  
In explaining his reasoning behind the decision, the judge 
appeared to rely heavily on Connon’s three prior felony convictions, 
although it was not explained how that sample of Connon’s activities 
and history weighed in the judge’s decision-making.212 It is possible 
that, as a result of those three prior felony convictions, the judge viewed 
Connon as a threat to public safety, leading the judge to fix monetary 
bail. Without the benefit of sufficiently detailed reasoning on the 
record, it is hard to imagine that Connon’s “dangerousness” did not 
factor into the judge’s decision-making. 
2.     People v. Lang 
In People v. Lang, the seventy-eight-year-old Lang was awaiting a 
new trial and sought to be released on his own recognizance or on 
nonmonetary conditions in the lead up to the new trial.213 Lang had 
been convicted of second-degree murder after he shot and killed his 
brother in 2012.214 After an issue with an alternate juror, the New York 
Court of Appeals reversed an order by the Appellate Division affirming 
the conviction.215 Second-degree murder remains a qualifying offense, 
and the judge was tasked with determining the least restrictive 
conditions to secure Lang’s return to court.216  
In accounting for Lang’s “activities and history,” the judge noted 
Lang’s lack of prior criminal convictions, that there was no evidence he 
was anything other than a model prisoner, that Lang had no record of 
flight to avoid criminal prosecution, and, specifically, that Lang did not 
attempt to flee to avoid prosecution in the eleven days he remained free 
after his arrest.217 Yet, the judge emphasized the nature of Lang’s 
particular offense and specifically the nature of his actions giving rise to 
 
 210 Id. at 849. 
 211 While this case is an example of judges’ leeway to read “dangerousness” into the statute, it 
doubles as an example of the reforms reducing inequality in the pretrial system through judges 
setting more manageable amounts of monetary bail. Here, the judge fixed bail as follows: (1) cash 
bail at $1,000; (2) insurance company bond at $1,000; or (3) partially secured surety bond at 
$2,000 with a ten percent deposit. Id. 
 212 See id. 
 213 People v. Lang, No. CR-12-034-I, 2020 WL 5552874, at *1, *4 (N.Y. Cnty. Ct. July 20, 2020). 
 214 Id. at *1. 
 215 Id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. at *1–2. 
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this case.218 The judge refrained from explicitly calling Lang dangerous 
or a risk to public safety. However, the judge’s bail decision, combined 
with the judge’s reasoning, reflects such a conclusion. The judge opted 
to fix three forms of bail in the following inflated amounts: (1) $500,000 
cash bail; (2) $2,000,000 insurance company bail bond; or (3) 
$2,000,000 partially secured surety bond with a ten percent deposit.219 
III.     PROPOSAL 
A.     Regulating Dollar Amounts of Monetary Bail 
The current state of New York’s bail law affords judges nearly 
unrestricted discretion to set bail at amounts so high that the intention 
of the reforms to reduce economic inequality in the criminal justice 
system is easily sidestepped. Although the new requirement that judges 
must fix at least one of a partially secured surety bond or unsecured 
surety bond is a step in the right direction, judges’ unfettered discretion 
renders the requirement nearly toothless. Assuming that eliminating 
monetary bail outright is not a politically likely outcome for the time 
being, and assuming that the Legislature would be unwilling to 
eliminate the decades-old language in the statute allowing judges to fix 
bail in differing dollar amounts, we must look elsewhere for possible 
solutions. 
A Bronx County Supreme Court judge authored a possible 
resolution to this dilemma in his decision in People v. Portoreal.220 After 
thoroughly laying out the machinations of New York’s bail law 
following the 2019 reforms,221 the judge reiterated that the Legislature 
intended to make it more likely that a given individual could post bail 
through the reforms.222 The judge also maintained that the lack of an 
up-front deposit accompanying unsecured bonds means that they 
provide little incentive for an individual to return to court.223  
Having decided, in this particular case, that monetary bail was the 
least restrictive condition that would reasonably assure the defendant’s 
 
 218 Id. at *3. 
 219 Id. at *4–5. 
 220 See generally People v. Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d 514 (Sup. Ct. 2019). 
 221 Id. at 518–24. 
 222 “Plainly, the Legislature intended that some defendants who cannot afford an insurance 
company bail bond should still be able to afford a partially-secured surety bond; otherwise, the 
provision of the Revised Bail Law mandating the availability of partially-secured bonds would 
have no practical meaning.” Id. at 526. 
 223 Id. 
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return to court, and having decided that an unsecured bond in any 
dollar amount would do little to achieve that end, the judge then set out 
on fixing the appropriate partially secured bond.224 He haphazardly 
reasoned that a partially secured bond amount should exceed an 
insurance company bail bond, since, dollar amounts being equal, the 
partially secured bond provides less of a financial incentive for a 
defendant to return to court.225 Meanwhile, the judge noted that setting 
the partially secured bond significantly higher than the insurance 
company bail bond would circumvent the Legislature’s goals.226 The 
judge’s solution was simple, yet arbitrary and seemingly pulled out of 
thin air: a partially secured bond should not be set more than three 
times higher than an insurance company bail bond.227 Thus, in 
Portoreal, the judge fixed bail in the following amounts: (1) $50,000 
cash bail; (2) $200,000 insurance company bail bond; or (3) $250,000 
partially secured bond.228 The outcome of Portoreal—setting three 
unaffordable forms of bail—underscores the flaw in this judge’s 
conception—a flaw that might yet be remedied with further tweaking. 
As exemplified by Portoreal, the widespread consequence of the 
judge’s idea would likely be higher bail amounts across the board. 
Without capping cash bail or insurance company bail bond amounts, 
judges would be tempted to raise those amounts to meet the “three 
times” requirement proposed by this judge, instead of lowering the 
partially secured bond amount to meet that same requirement. But 
codifying the judge’s idea into the bail law and building upon it might 
yet prove helpful to achieve the Legislature’s goals. The Legislature 
could build upon the Portoreal judge’s idea in three ways: (1) by capping 
cash bail and insurance company bail bonds at certain amounts, (2) by 
creating a presumption that judges set unsecured bonds rather than 
partially secured bonds, and (3) by reducing the maximum percentage 
of the undertaking that judges may require as an up-front deposit for 
partially secured bonds. 
In all, the revised bail law would look something like this: When 
judges determine that fixing monetary bail is the least restrictive 
condition that would reasonably ensure an individual’s return to 
court,229 judges would still be required to set three forms of bail, at least 
one of which would have to be a partially secured bond or unsecured 
 
 224 Id. at 525–27. 
 225 Id. at 526. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at 526–27. 
 228 Id. at 527. 
 229 See N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10 (McKinney 2020). Ideally, this would be an 
increasingly infrequent outcome. 
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bond.230 The revised statute would devise a cap on cash bail and on 
insurance company bail bonds. When deciding between setting either a 
partially secured bond or unsecured bond—assuming judges are 
unlikely to set both—there would be a presumption that judges shall 
opt for the unsecured bond unless the individual presents an acutely 
high risk of flight to avoid prosecution or has a history of failing to 
return to court. When judges select partially secured bonds, judges 
would be limited to setting them only so much higher than the amount 
of cash bail or insurance company bond—for the sake of clarity, let us 
say judges may only set partially secured bonds up to 120 percent of 
cash bail or an insurance company bail bond. Lastly, if a judge opts for 
a partially secured bond, the maximum that judges could require as an 
up-front deposit would be reduced from ten percent of the bond to, 
perhaps, one percent.  
Having built on the judge’s approach in this fashion, the dollar 
amount of each of the three forms of bail that judges must set will be 
both lower and closer in value. With a cap in place on cash bail and 
insurance company bail bonds, the previously untethered partially 
secured bond will now be anchored and more manageable for 
individuals to post. But in all such cases, the presumption in favor of 
the unsecured bond will often not require an individual to make any 
sort of up-front deposit. In all, this revision to New York’s bail law 
would meet the Legislature’s goal of reducing how one’s wealth impacts 
their freedom pending trial, while continuing to ensure that individuals 
return to court. 
B.     Revamping “Activities and History” 
The simplest path to excising, once and for all, public safety and 
“dangerousness” from judges’ considerations when determining the 
least restrictive conditions to ensure an individual returns to court 
would be to insert language to that effect directly into the statute. 
However, given the heated and polarized debate that has ensued each 
time the issue of public safety arises in the context of bail reform,231 that 
might be the path of most resistance, the path least likely to succeed, and 
maybe even the path most likely to backfire. Alternatively, the phrase 
“activities and history” could be removed from the statute altogether, 
though this is also unlikely to provide the sought-after clarity. Since the 
list of factors for judges to consider is non-exhaustive,232 judges would 
 
 230 See id. § 520.10. 
 231 See supra Section II.A. 
 232 See Portoreal, 116 N.Y.S.3d at 520–22. 
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remain free to consider “activities and history,” and countless other 
factors, even if the phrase were no longer to appear explicitly in the 
statute.  
Therein lies the first affirmative step towards eliminating public 
safety and “dangerousness” from factoring into bail outcomes. The 
Legislature should consider simply replacing the word “including” with 
the phrase “limited to.” In doing so, the Legislature would explicitly 
confine judges to the enumerated list of factors within the statute. The 
Legislature might then consider revising the list of factors, but, in any 
case, this revision would give judges a finite number of considerations, 
none of which involve public safety or “dangerousness.”  
This change, though, does not cure the ambiguity of the phrase 
“activities and history.” Defining the phrase as excluding public safety 
and “dangerousness” is unlikely to come to fruition, again due to the 
contentious nature of similar debates in years past. Beyond this option, 
the Legislature could consider refining the statutory language involving 
how judges explain their decisions. Currently, the bail law provides that 
judges “shall explain [their] choice of release, release with conditions, 
bail or remand on the record or in writing.”233 Requiring judges to 
explain their reasoning has the potential to be an effective way of 
holding judges to account and ensuring they only contemplate the 
appropriate considerations. But the statute as written allows judges to 
skate by with the most bare-bones of explanations of their reasoning. 
While it might be outside the scope of the Legislature to tell judges how 
to write their decisions, the Legislature should consider requiring 
judges to reaffirm on the record or in writing that they have not 
considered public safety or “dangerousness” when determining the least 
restrictive conditions to ensure an individual’s return to court.  
It is not possible to get inside of a judge’s head to truly understand 
their reasoning, beyond what they put on the record or in writing. No 
matter what the text of the statute says, there must always be a leap of 
faith that judges stay true to the considerations the Legislature affords 
them in making decisions involving pretrial conditions. While no 
revision to the statute can absolutely ensure that judges will not factor 
public safety and “dangerousness” into these decisions, this 
requirement can, at the very least, serve as a frequent reminder to judges 
of what remains in-bounds and what lies out-of-bounds when judges 
make these critical pretrial decisions. 
 
 233 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 510.10(1). 
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CONCLUSION 
As demonstrated, New York’s bail reform travails of the past few 
years have fallen flat in reducing the impact of economic inequality in 
pretrial detention outcomes. Although the revised bail law has already 
decreased jail and prison populations considerably,234 a goal of the 
reforms from the outset,235 New York’s criminal justice system and its 
pretrial detention system, in particular, continue to treat most harshly 
those with the least financial means. More important than failing to live 
up to the Governor’s and Legislature’s promises, the previous sentence 
describes an inherently unjust justice system: a system deploying 
something closer to a presumption of guilt—a presumption of guilt only 
for those of lesser financial means, that is—than we often profess. As 
Bryan Stevenson has presented, we operate “a system of criminal justice 
that continues to treat people better if they are rich and guilty than if 
they are poor and innocent.”236 Hope endures though, as bail reform 
efforts spearheaded by dedicated activists and reformers make inroads 
nationwide, and as the injustice of bail laws around the country begin 
to enter into the nation’s collective conscience.237  
The United States claims to regard as sacrosanct its presumption 
of innocence. In 1987 Chief Justice Rehnquist told us that “[i]n our 
society liberty is the norm, and detention prior to trial or without trial 
is the carefully limited exception.”238 But then, as now, that is not 
reality.239 That is not reality for the thousands upon thousands of people 
 
 234 See BAIL REFORM REVISITED, supra note 37, at 8–15. 
 235 2019 JUSTICE AGENDA, supra note 15, at 140. 
 236 BRYAN STEVENSON, JUST MERCY: A STORY OF JUSTICE AND REDEMPTION 313 (paperback 
ed. 2015). 
 237 For example, Illinois lawmakers recently voted to end the use of cash bail. See Isaac Scher, 
Illinois Will End Cash Bail—And Limit Use of High-Tech Incarceration, INTERCEPT (Jan. 17, 2021, 
7:00 AM), https://theintercept.com/2021/01/17/illinois-cash-bail-reform [https://perma.cc/
CSQ9-FMYE]. 
 238 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987) (emphasis added). 
 239 The following anecdote, tweeted by Rhiannon Hamam, a public defender in Texas and 
cohost of the 5-4 podcast, captures the sobering reality of this sentiment: 
I’m on hold with a county jail and the hold message playing references to people on 
the inside as “offenders.” More than 70% of people in this county jail have not been 
found guilty of a crime, they haven’t “offended” any law. Presumption of innocence 
where[?] 
@AywaRhiannon, TWITTER (Jan. 17, 2021, 8:15 PM), https://twitter.com/AywaRhiannon/status/
1350974958181228549 [https://perma.cc/5VNX-K37T]; see also Claire Lampen, The Prison 
Abolitionist Redefining What It Means to Win, CUT (Jan. 25, 2021), https://www.thecut.com/
2021/01/rhiannon-hamam-how-i-get-it-done.html [https://perma.cc/2ZYB-U8CH]. 
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confined to jails, yet presumed innocent, for no reason other than the 
fact that they lack the financial means to get out.  
That was not reality for Brandon Rodriguez, a twenty-five-year-old 
Staten Island man, who took his own life on August 10, 2021, while 
incarcerated pretrial at Rikers Island.240 Mr. Rodriguez was arrested on 
August 4, 2020, and he lacked the financial means to post cash bail of 
$5,000 or a bond set at $15,000, causing his incarceration pending 
trial.241 The State of New York may have reformed its pretrial detention 
system since Kalief Browder’s passing in 2015, but the reforms have not 
stamped out the injustices wrought by excessive bail and economic 
inequality. Mr. Rodriguez—a legally innocent man—was punished with 
a death penalty of sorts not for the commission of any crime, but rather 
for his lack of monetary wealth.242  
 Writing this Note in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic,243 with 
social justice movements reinvigorated following continued police 
killings of Black Americans including George Floyd and Breonna 
Taylor,244 and following the January 6, 2021, attack on the United States 
Capitol, a reframing of the debate around bail is in order. Instead of 
expressing outrage at the few individuals who are able to remain free 
 
 240 George Joseph, Twenty-Five Year Old Detainee Found Dead at Rikers, GOTHAMIST (Aug. 
12, 2021, 4:03 PM), https://gothamist.com/news/twenty-five-year-old-detainee-found-dead-
rikers [https://perma.cc/BVE4-L75G]. 
 241 At arraignment, a judge first set Mr. Rodriguez’s cash bail at $5,000 and a bond at $15,000, 
before reducing the amounts days later to $3,000 and $10,000 respectively. Id.; Graham Rayman, 
Staten Island Detainee Hangs Himself in NYC Jail Using T-Shirt: Sources, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 
13, 2021, 7:35 PM), https://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/ny-man-dead-rikers-
island-20210813-4dmqk7zi2rbcbp2ntfwxdho2ba-story.html [https://perma.cc/3Y6W-DNM7]; 
Tracey Porpora, Staten Island Man Found Dead in Prison Was Result of Alleged Suicide, Report 
Says, SILIVE.COM (Aug. 14, 2021, 9:14 AM), https://www.silive.com/news/2021/08/staten-island-
man-found-dead-in-prison-was-result-of-alleged-suicide-report-says.html [https://perma.cc/
SDV7-HSJ9]. 
 242 Mr. Rodriguez’s ordeal exemplifies Bryan Stevenson’s notion that “[t]he opposite of 
poverty is not wealth; the opposite of poverty is justice.” See STEVENSON, supra note 236, at 18. 
 243 The pandemic has wreaked acute devastation throughout jails and prisons across the 
United States. Given the cramped and confined nature of these facilities, combined with 
unsanitary conditions, inadequate testing, and a general apathy toward vaccinating people who 
are incarcerated along with employees of these facilities, jails and prisons quickly became hotbeds 
for the spread of the virus. See generally Schwartzapfel, Park & Demillo, supra note 131. Rikers 
Island, in particular, has become a “humanitarian crisis” during the pandemic due to high 
infection rates, rising inmate populations, staffing shortages, delays in court proceedings, and 
official mismanagement. Deanna Paul, Rikers Island Conditions Spiral Out of Control for Inmates 
and Officers, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 19, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/rikers-island-
conditions-spiral-out-of-control-for-inmates-and-officers-11632063601 [https://perma.cc/
ZY6D-BLF7]. 
 244 The inclusion of these names is in no way meant to exclude the many, many others lost to 
police violence. 
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pending trial—even those accused of committing heinous acts245—
perhaps we should channel this frustration into remedying the havoc 
wreaked upon the lives of thousands upon thousands of people by an 
unjust system of pretrial detention.  
 
 245 See, e.g., Travis Caldwell, Prosecutors Push to Rearrest Kyle Rittenhouse. Here’s How the 
Case Has Unfolded Since He Posted Bail, CNN (Feb. 4, 2021, 9:50 AM), https://www.cnn.com/
2021/02/04/us/kyle-rittenhouse-since-arrest-bail/index.html [https://perma.cc/WZA4-YBTV]; 
Natalie Parks, UK Senior Charged in Capitol Riot Released on $10,000 Bail After Court 
Appearance, KENTUCKYKERNEL (Jan. 27, 2021), http://www.kykernel.com/uk-senior-charged-in-
capitol-riot-released-on-10-000-bail-after-court-appearance/article_ac0d570e-5ac6-11eb-bf6b-
937095f80615.html [https://perma.cc/J8SL-GUW9]; Woman Who Allegedly Helped Steal Pelosi 
Laptop to Be Released from Jail, GUARDIAN (Jan. 21, 2021, 12:04 PM), 
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/21/riley-june-williams-nancy-pelosi-laptop-
capitol-jail-release [https://perma.cc/4WV3-SLJC]. 
